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I. INTRODUCTION
We live in an era of increasing awareness of the pressing claims
of environmentalism. We are more mindful of the risk of
environmental degradation and more acutely aware of the human
role in it than in any previous era. Additionally, the late twentieth
century and recent decades have seen an explosive growth in the
number of new constitutions, many with expansive and relatively
novel rights protections. These modem developments typify a
period of assertive constitutionalism and a relative confidence that
constitutions can solve problems that ordinary politics can or will
not. As applied to environmental concerns, there has been a
pronounced trend toward textual reference to the environment-
including (in an ever-growing number of constitutions)
enumeration of enforceable environmental rights guarantees.
Perhaps surprisingly, an overwhelming majority of
contemporary constitutions expressly refer to support for, or rights
to protect or sustain, a clean and healthy environment.' However,
these rights remain extraordinary and of uncertain practical effect
in constitutional adjudication. Even in this era of triumphant
constitutionalism and pending and present environmental crisis,
1. DAVID R. BOYD, THE ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS REVOLUTION: A GLOBAL STUDY OF
CoNsTrruTIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 50 (2012).
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we have only infrequently seen robust enforcement of
constitutional environmental rights.2
From the standpoint of traditional constitutional adjudication,
it is difficult to imagine a court halting a coal-fueled power plant
exclusively on the basis of the harm it will do to future generations'
enjoyment of a beautiful natural world. And, in light of practical
judicial considerations like plaintiff standing, traceable causation,
and discrete, identifiable harms, it is almost impossible to conceive
of a judge issuing an injunction on foresting because of
incalculable future contributions to global warming. Indeed, it is
hard to imagine adjudicatory solutions to all but the most tangible
and immediate environmental hans. But imagination is just the
point: there has been a failure of imagination on the part of many
constitutional courts. Despite the prevalence of environmental
rights language in national constitutions, few national courts have
consistently held environmental rights to be enforceable limits on
state or private actors.3
In this modern era of constitutionalism, the South African
Constitutional Court has been hailed as one of the "most
respected legal institutions in the world" 4 and the South African
Constitution has been described as "the most admirable
constitution in the history of the world."5 And yet, the response of
the post-apartheid Constitutional Court typifies the tension
created by constitutional environmental rights: inclusion of
aggressive textual rights in the Constitution but an inclination
toward meek judicial enforcement.
However, there are numerous reasons why South Africa is
uniquely positioned to influence and advance the use of
constitutional rights to protect the environment. South Africa
demonstrates a collection of special capacities to address domestic
adjudication concerns and influence comparative dialogue
regarding constitutional environmental rights. The Constitutional
Court evidences potential domestic solutions through its modest,
extant jurisprudence and offers a far greater potential for positive
outcomes through its practice of constitutionalizing environmental
framework legislation. Additionally, the Court holds a uniquely
2. Id. at 71-76.
3. Id. at 45-76.
4. Karl Klare, Legal Subsidiauity & Constitutional Rights: A Reply to AJ van der Wald, 9
CONST. CT. REV. 129, 129 (2008).
5. CAss SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS Do 261 (2002).
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influential position in the field of comparative constitutional law
with its expansive rights protections, permissive jurisdictional rules,
hard-wired consideration of foreign and international law, and its
unrivaled reputation among academics and jurists.
This Article will assess the current level of constitutional
protection provided by the South African Constitution and its
potential to facilitate and influence the uncertain rise of
constitutional environmental rights in the modern era. Following
this Introduction, Part II recreates and examines the process by
which environmental protections became part of the post-
apartheid South African Constitution, drawing from original
source research. Part III provides a detailed analysis of the textual
right that arose from the constitutional process and reviews the
core environmental case law of the Constitutional Court so far.
And the final section, Part IV, analyzes the viability of this model of
environmental adjudication and the potential consequences for
South Africa and comparative constitutionalism.
II. THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A CLEAN AND
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT
Because pollution and degradation of the natural environment
are as old as human civilization, social and legal responses to
environmental degradation can be traced back nearly as far. 6 Of
course, the development of new technologies, the pace of
industrialization, and the population boom of the last two
centuries have exacerbated the harm humans inflict upon the
Earth. To some extent the increased prospect of ruination has
yielded novel potential solutions. While many legal mechanisms
exist for stewardship of natural resources, the assurance of .a
healthful environment, and the advancement of sustainable means
of development, it is only in recent decades that we have seen such
protections take a constitutional form. The invention of
constitutional environmental rights7 is a particularly recent trend
6. See J. DONALD HUGHES, AN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY OF THE WORLD:
HUMANKIND'S CHANGING ROLE IN THE COMMUNITY OF LIFE (2002); see also THE
ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY TIMELINE, http://www.environmentalhistory.org (last visited
Feb. 27, 2013).
7. By the general term "constitutional environmental rights" in this Article, I am
referring broadly to the incorporation of environmental concerns into the framework of a
constitution's protection of human rights. This can take an array of forms and includes
both procedural and substantive rights and duties. Most of this Article will focus on the
specific South African form of constitutional environmental rights, but even the more
[Vol. 32:215
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even within that short-lived history of protective environmental
law.8
While there is little controversy to the assertion that
environmental degradation crosses borders and has detrimental
impacts outside the particular state where it originates,9 there has
nevertheless been significant impetus to create national
protections for the environment. This is likely further motivated by
the potentially ineffectual nature of international law protections
in addition to specifically domestic concerns with environmental
degradation.
A surprising number of countries currently reference the
environment in their national constitutions. The 2012 book, The
Environmental Rights Revolution, reported that 147 out of 193
countries mentioned the environment in some form in their
constitutions as of 2011 and 92 included substantive
environmental rights in their constitutional text.'0 In some
regions, almost no countries have such rights (North America)
while in other regions nearly every country includes them (Latin
America and Europe)." Nearly all such textual references have
been the result of drafting or amending constitutions in the last
several decades-particularly since the 1972 Stockholm
Declaration, the first substantial international human rights
document to address environmental rights.12 In 1972 there were
six such constitutions, which increased to 45 by the end of the
1980s and 113 by 1999.13 Since 2000, 34 countries have adopted
constitutions or constitutional amendments that refer to the
environment in text.'1
general references are meant to include express, judicially enforceable rights.
8. KATHRYN L. SCHROEDER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 22-25 (2007).
9. United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, June 2-16, 1972,
Declaration / the United Nations Conference on the Hiuman Lnvironment, U.N. Doc.
A CONF.48/14/Rev. 1 (1972) (stating in Principle 24: "Cooperation through multilateral
or bilateral arrangements or other appropriate means is essential to effectively control,
prevent, reduce and eliminate adverse environmental effects resulting from activities
conducted in all spheres").
10. BOYD, supra note 1, at 49.
11. Id. at 53-57.
12. United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, su/ra note 9 (stating in
Principle 1: "Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions
of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being, and he
bears a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and
future generations.").
13. BOYD, supirai note 1, at 49.
14. Id.
2013] 219
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This rise of environmental rights in international and foreign
constitutional law coincided with the end of apartheid and the
inauguration of constitutional democracy in South Africa. The
country's political parties and its constituent assembly were
drafting a constitution intended to
Heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on
democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights;
Lay the foundations for a democratic and open society in which
government is based on the will of the people and every citizen is
equally protected by law;
Improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of
each person; and
Build a united and democratic South Africa able to take its
rightful place as a sovereign state in the family of nations.'
5
Constitutional environmental rights, although not directly
related to the core values of dignity and equality in the post-
apartheid Constitution, were part of the human rights
conversation that was at the heart of South Africa's transformation.
A. The End of Apartheid and the Rise of Constitutionalism in South Afica
Although the South African constitutional drafting process
involved significant struggle and uncertainty, it ultimately achieved
a goal considered impossible for decades: a relatively nonviolent
transition from "racial autocracy to a nonracial democracy, by
means of a negotiated transition, the progressive implementation
of democracy, and respect for fundamental human rights."16
Although environmental protections were not central to the
democratic transition, they were included in both of South Africa's
transitional constitutions -with initially modest protections
expanded significantly in the final Constitution. The centrality of
human rights in the constitutional process, the timely evolution of
the notion of environmental rights, and the noncontroversial
nature of such rights (relative to the larger issues separating the
core negotiating parties) facilitated the ultimate inclusion of
substantial environmental rights in the South African Constitution.
15. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, pmbl.
16. Albie Sachs, Constitutional Developments in South Affica, 28 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL.
695, 695 (1996); AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS, A lhief History of the African National
Congress, http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=206 (last visited April 7, 2013).
[Vol. 32:215220
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1. The Interim Constitution and democratic elections.
The initial, core conflict between the dominant parties at the
1991-92 constitutional convention, the Convention for a
Democratic South Africa (CODESA), was a disagreement about
the process for drafting the constitution. 7 Was the purpose of
CODESA merely to create a minimalist constitutional framework
to facilitate democratic elections and enable a popularly-elected
body to draft the Constitution? Or, were the party-appointed
CODESA delegates intended to write the entire constitution? The
opposing positions represented the fundamental strategic goals of
the African National Congress (ANC), the popular and newly
unbanned anti-apartheid party, and the National Party (NP),
representing the still-powerful, white-minority apartheid
government. The ANC wanted CODESA to have the most
constrained possible directive so that the new constitution would
be drafted by a newly elected (and sure-to-be ANC-dominated)
legislature. The NP, aware of its ever-decreasing power, wanted
CODESA to write an entire constitution that would protect the
white minority through codification of individual and group rights,
protection from prosecution for apartheid-era actions, and clauses
preserving the economic status quo.'8 The compromise solution to
this problem was a two-stage constitutional drafting process with a
newly-formed constitutional court enforcing the parties'
negotiated agreement. 9
The first stage of the process involved drafting a preliminary
constitution (the 1993 "Interim Constitution"), holding South
Africa's first fully democratic elections, and selecting members of
the new Parliament that would choose a new president. The
17. The total work of the CODESA (and its follow-up negotiations, the Multi-Party
Negotiating Process) was carried out by five Working Groups. The bulk of the Bill of
Rights determinations and the procedural details of the constitutional process-and the
vast majority of the most divisive issues-came out of Working Group Two. Other Groups
addressed different aspects of the transition to democracy. See LOURENS DU PLESSIS &
HUGH CORDER, UNDERSTANDING SouTH AFRICA'S TRANSITIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 4-6
(1994) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING].
18. See generlly ALLISTER SPARKS, TOMORROW IS ANOTHER COUNTRY: THE INSIDE
STORY OF SOUTH AFRICA'S ROAD TO CHANGE (1995); PATTI WALDMEIR, ANATOMY OF A
MIRACLE (1997) (providing general histories of the political transformation of South
Africa at the end of the apartheid era).
19. The basic structure of this plan was originally proposed by Nelson Mandela one
year prior to the start of CODESA, tacitly approved by President de Klerk at CODESA's
inaugural session, and formalized over the course of CODESA. PATTI WALDMEIR,
ANATOMY OFA MIRACLE 194-95 (1997).
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second stage gave the task of crafting the final constitution (the
1996 Constitution)20 to the newly elected Parliament and Senate in
their additional role as the Constitutional Assembly. Two
safeguards linked the two stages of the process: a set of thirty-four
inviolable constitutional principles (known as the Thirty-four
Principles), which were agreed upon by the initial negotiating
parties to constrict the subsequent final constitution,2' and a
constitutional court appointed under the Interim Constitution
with the task of certifying that the final Constitution conformed
with the negotiated agreement preserved in the Thirty-four
Principles.22
Altogether, nearly two years passed between the start of formal
constitutional negotiations at CODESA and the approval of the
Interim Constitution and the thoroughly negotiated Thirty-four
Principles.23 The provisions of the Interim Constitution-with its
Bill of Rights inclusive of a modest environmental right-came
into effect on the first day of South Africa's first multiracial
elections, April 26, 1994.24 The results of the election-important
because of the elected ministers' role as drafters of the
constitution that would replace the Interim Constitution-gave
the ANC 62.7 percent of the National Assembly and made Nelson
Mandela the President of the Republic of South Africa.25
20. It is, of course, a bit of a misnomer to refer to the 1996 Constitution as the final
constitution. The "final" Constitution has been amended twelve times since its completion
in December 1996, although none are directly relevant to this Article. SOUTH AFRICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/constitution/
english-web/index.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2012); CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF
SOUTH AFRICA (1996), available at http://www.info.gov.za/documents/constitution
/amendments.htm (listing and noting amendments).
21. S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST., 1993, sched. 4.
22. Id.; Albie Sachs, South Africa's Unconstitutional Constitution, 41 ST. Louis U. L.J.
1249, 1255 (1997).
23. Work was completed by the party delegates late in the evening on November 17,
1993. UNDERSTANDING, supra note 17, at 2-17.
24. ELECTION '94 SOUTH AFRICA: THE CAMPAIGN, RESULTS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
187 (Andrew Reynolds ed., 1994) [hereinafter ELECTION '94].
25. South Africa's democratic elections were held over several days beginning on
April 26, 1994. Despite serious allegations of fraud and ballot tampering, the results
(outside KwaZulu-Natal) conformed with expectations to a significant degree: the ANC
received a strong but not overly dominant 62.7 percent, the NP received a disappointing
20.4 percent, the Zulu-nationalist Inkatha Freedom Party won the KwaZulu-Natal Province,
and the extremist parties on both the left and right received only marginal percentages. Id.
at 183.
[Vol. 32:215
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2. The 'final Constitution, " the Public Participation Programme, and
certification
The Constitutional Assembly began working on the text of the
final Constitution in May 1994. Under the Interim Constitution,
the Assembly was given two years to complete its task.26 Most of the
work was conducted primarily in small "theme committees" rather
than in public sessions.27 The committees held hearings; analyzed
submissions from the political parties, private organizations, and
citizens; and identified areas of agreement and disagreement.
Theme Committee findings were then forwarded to the
Constitutional Committee, the authoritative party-based
negotiating body of the Constitutional Assembly, where the core of
the decision-making process occurred.28
Additionally, the Constitutional Assembly inaugurated a
widespread public education and popular engagement program.
The Public Participation Programme recognized the "fundamental
significance of a Constitution in the lives of citizens" and thus
sought to place public participation "at the centre of the
Constitution-making process."29  The Public Participation
Programme was meant to instill a feeling of citizen involvement in
the constitutional process and to provide legitimacy for its
outcome.30 More than two million submissions were received from
26. S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST. 1993, ch. 5, § 73.
27. Theme committees were identified by number and had the following foci:
(1) character of state, (2) structure of state, (3) relations between levels of government,
(4) fundamental rights, (5) judiciary and legal systems, and (6) specialized structures. See
Jeremy Sarkin, The Driafing of South Africa'v Final Constitution from a Iuman-Rights Islepective,
47 AMJ. COMP. L. 67, 70 n.23 (1999).
28. The Constitutional Committee was comprised of members of the seven political
parties represented in Parliament in proportion to the number of seats they held in the
National Assembly: the ANC (252 seats in parliament), the NP (82), the IFP (43), the
Democratic Party (7), the Freedom Front (9), the Pan African Congress (5), and the
African Christian Democratic Party (2). See ELECTION '94, supra note 24, at 183.
29. Const. Assembl., Rep. of S. Afr., The Public Participation Programme,
http://www.constitution.org.zalfct22115.html#PART (last visited Jan. 13, 2007) (cited in
Eric C. Christiansen, Elnding the Apartheid of the Closel, 32 N.Y.U J. INT'L L. c POL. 997
(2000); see also HASSEN EBRAHIM, THE SOUL OF A NATION: CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN
SOUTH AFRiCA 239-50 (1999) (detailing the successes of the Public Participation
Programme in engaging the public).
30. As the media releases from the Constitutional Assembly described it: "The final
submission was hand-delivered to the Constitutional Assembly at 11:30pm and at midnight
the fax lines were still humming as the country's greatest ever public participation
campaign came to a close [on February 20, 1996]." Constitutional Assembly, Constitutional
Talk: The Official Newsietter (fthe Constituiional Assembly, vol. 2, (Mar. 8, 1996). Participation
in all aspects of the program exceeded expectations. See id. vol. 9, (June 30, 1995).
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citizens and domestic groups.31 While there were complaints that
the program was not fully effective at reaching rural communities,
informal settlements, women, and elderly citizens, a 1996
independent survey found that the media campaign had reached
18.5 million people, seventy-three percent of adult South
Aficans.32
The text of the final Constitution was adopted by an
overwhelming majority in both houses of Parliament-80 of 90
Senators and 321 of 400 National Assembly members-
significantly above the required two-thirds majority of the entire
Constitutional Assembly.33  However, the proposed final
Constitution could not be signed by the President or come into
force unless and until the Constitutional Court certified it.34 The
31. Submissions in phase one totaled 1.8 million and submissions for phase two
totaled 250,000. Id. vol. 8, (June 8, 1995). Additionally, over 80,000 people attended public
meetings and constitutional education workshops sponsored by the Assembly throughout
the country. More than 10,000 calls were recorded on the Constitutional Talk-line, a five-
language information source. Thousands more tuned in to weekly television and radio
broadcasts. The Internet Project placed a host of available documents online: Assembly
minutes, working drafts of the Constitution, submissions as they were received, Assembly
press releases, and articles from the official newsletter Constitutional Talk. Id. vol. 2, (Mar.
8, 1996).
32. The survey was conducted by the Community Agency for Social Equality. Id. vol.
3, (Apr. 22, 1996). This number, up from sixty-five percent as reported in Constitutional
Talk, vol. 5, 1995 (Mar. 17, 1995), was significantly improved by the publication of the
working draft of the Constitution in November 1995. Id. vol. 2, (Mar. 8, 1996). Over four
million copies of a special thirty-two page Constitutional Talk edition were produced in all
eleven official languages. The publication contained the complete text of the draft
Constitution, explanatory articles outlining the issues, and a series of graphics aimed at
making the often complex constitutional issues accessible to ordinary South Africans. Id.
vol. 1, (Feb. 9, 1996).
33. The Constitutional Assembly consisted of the 400 newly elected members of the
National Assembly and the ninety members of the Senate. 3 DEBATES OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY, Rep. of S. Afr. 447-52, 524-25 (1996). Only one party, the
African Christian Democratic Party, voted against the text (with two votes). The Freedom
Front, a white right-wing party, abstained from the vote with 13 votes. Id.
34. See S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST., 1993, ch. 5, § 71(2) ("The new constitutional text
passed by the Constitutional Assembly, or any provision thereof, shall not be of any force
and effect unless the Constitutional Court has certified that all the provisions of such text
comply with the Constitutional Principles referred to in subsection (1)(a)."). "It is
necessary to underscore again that the basic certification exercise involves measuring the
[final constitutional text] against the [Thirty-four Principles]. The latter contain the
ftndamental guidelines, the prescribed boundaries, according to which and within which
the [Constitutional Assembly] was obliged to perform its drafting function." Certification of
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) para. 32 (S. Afr.)
[hereinafter Certification 11. "Suffice it at this stage to make two points. First, that this
Court's duty-and hence its power-is confined to such certification. Second,
certification means a good deal more than merely checking off each individual provision
SOUTH AFRICAN ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS
Constitutional Court, established under the Interim Constitution,
was required to declare whether the proposed text complied with
each of the Principles annexed to the 1993 Constitution.35
The Interim Constitution's Thirty-four Principles established
"the fundamental guidelines, the prescribed boundaries,
according to which and within which the [Constitutional
Assembly] was obliged to perform its drafting function."3 6 The
inclusion of environmental rights was one set of provisions-
among many-challenged as impermissibly included in the
Constitution when the Certification case came before the
Constitutional Court.
B. Environmental Rights and South African Constitutionalism
1. Apartheid and the environment.
Much of the contemporary relationship between South
Africans and the natural world derives from colonial and apartheid
policies designed to ensure racially-determined occupation and
ownership of land. The systematic dislocation of black South
Africans, created endemic poverty that exacerbated the existing
pressures on the natural world. The seminal statement of
opposition to apartheid, the 1955 Freedom Charter, stated that
"our people have been robbed of their birthright to land" and
thus asserted that "[r]estrictions of land ownership on a racial
basis shall be ended, and all the land redivided amongst those who
work it to banish famine and land hunger."3 7
But in fact the relationship between apartheid oppression and
the environment is far greater than just the forced removals of
black South Africans from their homes and land. It also
encompasses wildlife conservation (through "reservations,"
reserving wildlife for white hunting and viewing), the designation
of "Protected Areas" that excluded most South Africans, and the
enforced patterns of residence to facilitate industrialization in the
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries.38 This history underlies
of the [final text] against the several [Principles]." Id. at ch.1, § B, para. 17.
35. Certification I, sufna note 34, paras. 1-19, 26-31.
36. Id. para. 32.
37. AFRICAN NAT'L CONG., The Iteedom Charter (1955), available/e at
http://www.anc.oig.za/show.php?id=72 (as adopted at the Congress of the People,
Kliptown, on Jun. 26, 1955).
38. See generally, Farieda Khan, Envionmentalism i, South Afica: A Socitopolifical
Petspective, 9 MACALESTER INT'L 156 (2000).
2013] 225
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popular attitudes both supporting and opposing environmental
protections in the post-apartheid constitution.
Colonialism itself, which began in the Sixteenth Century in
South Africa,39 was often destructive to the environment. 40 The rise
in population following the influx of first Dutch and then British
colonists to South Africa, as well as the increase in and changing
patterns of natural resource usage, introduced previously unknown
ecological pressures and harms. Over-population resulted in over-
hunting, over-grazing and deforestation; and the relocation of
indigenous peoples-often to areas lacking resources-added
pressures and resulted in environmental degradation in expanded
areas.4'
In South Africa, where colonialism eventually evolved into the
modern apartheid state, the environmental consequences were
particularly severe. From the mid-Nineteenth -to mid-Twentieth
Century, patterns of enforced settlement grew more rigid and
more damaging to native populations.42 Increasingly the land was
divided into European settlement areas, African communal areas
and (effectively European) conservation areas. Even before the
onset of full apartheid in 1948,43 the law assigned only thirteen
percent of the total land area in South Africa to indigenous people
representing seventy-one percent of the South African
population." These restrictions on residence and movement left
cities as areas primarily for white Europeans and left significant
rural areas unoccupied. Most natural resources were similarly
available for use or exploitation by whites only.45
The government often used the designation of Protected Areas
39. LEONARD THOMPSON, A HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA 32-34 (2001).
40. L. A. LEWIS & L. BERRY, AFRICAN ENVIRONMENTS AND RESOURCES 94 (1998).
41. People and Parks Programme, History, DEP'T OF ENVTL. AFFAIRS, REPUBLIC OF S.
AFR., http://www.peopleandparks.com/aboIt/history.htm.
42. THOMPSON, supra note 39, at 110-86; see generally SOUTH AFRICA HISTORY ONLINE,
http://www.sahistoiy.org.za (last visited May 30, 2013).
43. THOMPSON, sunra note 39, at 143; see generally SOUTH AFRICA HISTORY ONLINE,
http://www.sahistory.org.za (last visited May 30, 2013).
44. Johan van Tooyen & Bongiwe Njobe-Mbuli, Access to Land: Selecting the
Beneficiaries, in AGRICULTURAL LAND REFORM IN SOUTH AFRICA: POLICIES, MARKET, AND
MECHANISMS 461 (J. van Zyl ed. 1996) ("Approximately 87 per cent of agricultural land is
held by almost 67,000 white farmers and accommodates a total population of 5.3 million.
The remaining 71 per cent of the population, which is predominantly black, live on 13 per
cent of the land in high density areas-the former homelands.").
45. See generally Khan, supra note 38.
226 [Vol. 32:215
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as the legal basis for forced removals of black South Africans.4 6 The
small areas of land to which blacks were removed typically had
inadequate resources, services, and opportunity. The
consequences for black South Africans were severe and enduring,
resulting in insurmountable cycles of poverty. Inevitably, poor
health resulted from pollution caused by overcrowding and the
frequent absence of even rudimentary clean water or waste
management services. 47 With the discovery of gold and the
increased pursuit of South Africa's mineral wealth, the patterns of
worker residence (temporary residence in shanty towns
neighboring industrial sites or in excessively overcrowded hostels)
exacerbated the creation of and exposure to unhealthy
environmental conditions.48 The same elements that contributed
to poverty and poor health for relocated black South Africans also
damaged the environment. Informal settlements without adequate
facilities for clean water or waste removal polluted their
surrounding areas and inadequate resources for fuel resulted in
rapid deforestation, soil erosion, and other harms to the natural
world.49
The poor and marginal stiffer the brunt of environmental
pollution and natural resource degradation. Indeed they often
suffer outright expropriation of land, forests, fisheries, and other
natural resources. Moreover, because the rights of the poor to
have a political voice receives less protection, they are often the
least able to press for just compensation-or to say "no" to
unwanted development.50
The "jewel" of South African environmentalism has always
been the designation of unoccupied (or forcibly cleared) land as
national parks and game reserves. The first game parks emerged in
the late Eighteenth Century with a primary purpose of restricting
hunting by indigenous people and preserving game for white
European hunters.5' Even the establishment of parks for legitimate
conservation purposes inevitably resulted in the forcible removal
46. Khan, supra note 38., at158.
47. ALAN B. DURNING, APARTHEID'S ENVIRONMENTAL TOLL 7-14 (1990).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: CONFLICTS AND NORMS IN A
GLOBALIZING WORLD I (Lyuba Zarsky, ed. 2002).
51. Khan, siupra note 38, at 158.
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or relocation of native communities and the termination of rights
to the resources that had been traditionally available to them.5 2
Moreover, any benefits that resulted from the conservation
efforts were legally or effectively denied to black South Africans.
For example, the world-renowned Kruger National Park remained
segregated in its facilities until the 1980s. 5 3 In practice, most areas
of South Africa were open to white South Africans only. Either
through grand apartheid (the policies of geographic relocation
and separation) or through petty apartheid (the enforced
segregation in public places including beaches, parks, and much
more), most South Africans were denied access to the areas
reserved for enjoying the natural world.5 4
In summary, the result in the waning years of the apartheid era
was that ostensibly "pro-environment" policies had been used to
facilitate apartheid-era harms. Even as the influx of Europeans
applied heightened pressures on.food and other natural resources,
many South Africans were denied a means of subsistence by the
creation of game reserves and were forcibly removed from their
land by discriminatory laws. "Environmentalism" had offered
black South Africans essentially no benefit under apartheid:
wildlife protections had been the basis for a denial of sustenance
and an attack on a traditional way of life, and land conservation
had been a tool of political control and socio-economic
oppression. As the new Constitution was being drafted, there was
fear that environmental conservation would be used to deny the
land restitution claims that were a central tenet of the claims of
anti-apartheid groups.55 Because much of the land claimed by
52. Khan, supra note 38, at 175.
53. See JANE CARRUTHERS, THE KRUGER NATIONAL PARK. A SOCIAL AND POLITICAL
HISTORY (1995); SALOMON JOUBERT, THE KRUGER NATIONAL PARIC A HISTORY (2007);
Hasani Patrick Shikolokolo, An Evaluation of the Impact of Kruger National Park' Development
Programme on the Ilanganani Community in the Limpopo Province (2010) (unpublished
Masters thesis) (on file with the University of Limpopo), available at
http://ul.netd.ac.za/bitstream/ 10386/327/1/Shikolokolo%20H.P%20dissertation.pdf
("The park's policies prevented Black Africans from visiting the parks. And few who could
afford visiting the park were sometimes not tolerated.... This process resulted in negative
attitude and perceptions developing towards the park and conservation in general.").
54. Apartheid segregation and discrimination prohibited in law or in practice. See,
e.g., Reservation of Separate Amenities Act 49 of 1953 (S Mr.); Group Areas Act 41 of 1950
(S. Mr.). "Grand Apartheid" established separate homelands and residence and working
areas, and "Petty Apartheid" segregated public places including parks, beaches, and other
outdoor venues. LEONARD THOMPSON, A HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA 125 (2001).
55. Annika Dahlberg, Rick Rohde & Klas Sandell, National Parks and Environmental
Justice: Comparing Access Rights and Ideological Legacies in Three Countries, 8 CONSERV. & SOC'Y
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black South Africans was in Protected Areas, conservation had the
potential to thwart the rights of black South Africans.5 6 This set up
a potential conflict between the core goals of the ANC (as the post-
apartheid government) and environmentalists.
2. Environmentalism and the ANC.
The ANC affirmed the need for ajusticiable Bill of Rights in a
post-apartheid constitution in its 1989 publication Constitutional
Guidelines for a New South Africa: "The Constitution shall include a
Bill of Rights based on the Freedom Charter.57 Such a Bill of
Rights shall guarantee the fundamental human rights of all
citizens . . . and shall provide appropriate mechanisms for their
enforcement."5 8
Environmental rights were not mentioned in the Constitutional
Guidelines, just as they had not been mentioned in the Freedom
Charter. The primary concerns were the rejection of apartheid
legal norms and the promotion of political equality and
socioeconomic opportunity. Of course, the relationship of the
state to "land" was central to the justice sought, but the primary
concern was restitution to address the history of forced removals of
black South Africans from their land.59 Protection of the
environment did not initially qualify as a central concern.
However, at the start of the 1990s, environmental rights were
209, 212-13 (2010).
56. Id. This concern about constitutional rights entrenching the existing economic
injustice is a component of the general concern about rights in a post-apartheid state. This
public property concern minrrored a concern over private property rights; too vigorous
protection of either public land use designations or of private property rights would
merely protect the dramatically unjust status quo of the apartheid years.
57. Adopted by the 3,000-delegate Congress of the People on June 26, 1955, the
ANC-authored Freedom Charter was the political manifesto of the anti-apartheid
movement. In addition to the core tenetof multi-racialism, the document also emphasized
redistribution of wealth, land ownership by those who work it, equal protection of the law,
and other social and economic rights. It was the primary ANC statement of values
throughout most of the organization's history and has been retroactively labeled a proto-
Bill of Rights. For full text of the Charter, see Congress of the People, The Freednm Chaiter
(1955), as rtrinted in 21 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 249, app. C at 249-51 (1989-1990).
58. African National Congress, Constitutional Guidelines fr a Democratic South Afiica, 21
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 235, app. A at 237 (1989-1990). The guidelines were the subject
of extensive review and critique in South Africa. "Indeed, so many bodies have taken up,
analysed, and criticised the Guidelines that they have ceased to be simply an ANC
document; instead they have become a working text for the entire anti-apartheid
movement." Albie Sachs, A Bill of Rightfs Sonuh Africa: Areas of Agmernent and Disagreement,
21 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 13,17 (1989-1990).
59. Id.
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increasingly appearing in national constitutions. Following the
1972 Stockholm Declaration, several dozen countries had added
environmental provisions to their constitutions, but overall the
rights were still relatively uncommon.60 Prior to 1990, only three
African countries had incorporated environmental rights:
Madagascar in 1959 (the second in the world), Tanzania in 1977,
and Equatorial Guinea in 1982.61
But as the end of apartheid approached, the ANC (and, as well,
the NP) was engaged in serious internal discussions of which
constitutional rights should appear in the post-apartheid
constitution. Both showed a willingness to consider a broader
spectrum of rights than appeared in many constitutions. 6 2 By the
time the ANC Constitutional Committee publicized their draft bill
of rights in May 1992, environmental rights had been added to the
provisions. Article 12, entitled "Land and the Environment,"
stated, "The land, the waters and the sky and all the natural assets
which they contain, are the common heritage of the people of
South Africa who are equally entitled to their enjoyment and
responsible for their conservation." 63
The provisions of the section "Environmental Rights"
addressed traditional ecological concerns:
[14.] All men and women shall have the right to a healthy and
ecologically balanced environment and the duty to defend it.
[15.] In order to secure this right, the State, acting through
appropriate agencies and organs shall conserve, protect, and
improve the environment, and in particular:
a. prevent and control pollution of the air and waters and
degradation and erosion of the soil;
b. have regard in local, regional and national planning to the
maintenance or creation of balanced ecological and biological
areas and to the prevention or minimizing of harmful effects on
the environment;
c. promote the rational use of natural resources, safeguarding
their capacity for renewal and ecological stability;
60. BOYD, supra note 1, at 49.
61. Id. Although notably, South Africa's immediate neighbors, Mozambique and
Namibia, adopted constitutional environmental rights in 1990.
62. Sachs, supra note 58, at 16-17.
63. ALBIE SACHS, ADvANCING HUMAN RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA 224 (1992)
(including the ANC Draft Bill of Rights in the appendix). A copy of the ANC Bill of Rights
can be found in the ANC's online archives at http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=231.
230 [Vol. 32: 215
SOUTH AFRICAN ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS
d. ensure that long-term damage is not done to the
environment by the industrial or other forms of waste;
e. maintain, create and develop natural reserves, parks, and
recreational areas and classify. and protect other sites and
landscapes so as to ensure the preservation and protection of
areas of outstanding cultural, historic and natural interest.
[16.] Legislation shall provide for co-operation between the
State, non-governmental organisations, local communities, and
individuals in seeking to improve the environment and
encourage ecologically sensible habits in daily life.
[17.] The law shall provide for appropriate penalties and
reparation in the case of any damage caused to the environment,
and permit the interdiction by any interested person or by any
agency established for the purpose of protecting the
environment, of any public or private activity or undertaking
which manifestly and unreasonably causes or threatens to cause
irreparable damage to the environment.64
Apartheid had been bad for the environment as well. And
unsurprisingly, the people who most acutely experienced these
harms were black South Africans.
By the end of the year, the ANC had formulated their
constitutional proposals in a more popular form, as presented in
the document Ready to Govern.65 The purpose of the document was
to outline the ANC's vision for the future of South Africa. Rather
than being a draft legal document, it was a statement of political
principles approved by the ANC leadership. One of its sections was
devoted to explaining the ANC's positions on environmental
issues. It began with an overarching policy statement:
The ANC believes that all citizens of South Africa at present and
in the future, have the right to a safe and healthy environment,
and to a life of well-being. Accordingly, the broad objectives of
our environmental policy are aimed at fulfilling this right. In this
context, growth and development within South Africa must be
based on the criteria of sustainability. 66
This broad policy statement was followed by a series of
64. Id.
65. See AFRIcAN NAT'L CONG., Ready to Govern: ANC Policy Guidelines for a Democralic
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"guiding principles" intended to illustrate the meaning of this
policy:
Sustainable development;
Equitable access to environmental resources;
Public participation in all planning decisions which affect the
development and management of natural resources;
Public right of access to information and the courts on issues of
environmental concern;
An integrated approach to environmental issues that relates to all
sectors of society;
Recognition of the integrated nature of the global environment
and the need for international cooperation in policy making.
With the publication of the draft bill of rights and Ready to
Govern, the ANC had announced its commitment to protecting the
environment to both elite and mainstream audiences.
The National Party had a corollary document to the ANC's
Ready to Govern entitled the Constitutional Rule in a Participatory
Democracy.67 The document focused on the NP's primary concerns:
the structuring and division of political power in the post-
apartheid state. Neither the environment nor environmental
protections were mentioned.68
3. Environmental rights and the Interim Constitution.
In 1993, the initial drafting of the interim Bill of Rights was
assigned to the Technical Committee on Fundamental Rights
During the Transition. The Technical Committee consisted of
lawyers, civil rights workers, and former activists with legal
backgrounds.69 Hence, much of the drafting of the content of the
Bill of Rights was the work of rights "experts" rather than party
negotiators.70
The authors' task was carefully circumscribed in theory: they
were to draft a proposed list of the minimal rights necessary for the
envisioned two-year interim period prior to adoption of the final
67. FED. COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L PARTY, CONSTITUTIONAL RULE IN A PARTICIPATORY
DEMOCRACY: THE NATIONAL PARTY'S FRAMEWORK FOR A NEW DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA
(1991).
68. Id.
69. UNDERSTANDING, supra note 17, at 24-25.
70. Id. at 39-40.
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Constitution. The elected Constitutional Assembly would then
draft the full Bill of Rights for the final Constitution. 7' The
Technical Committee saw its duty as striking a balance "between
protecting, on the one hand, too many and, on the other, too few
fundamental rights during the transition."72 The rights list
proposed by the Committee was meant to be affirmed by the
drafting convention as a whole in advance of the elections.73 The
Technical Committee far exceeded its mandate, producing a
relatively detailed Bill of Rights based on a variety of foreign and
international precedents. 74 The resulting final Bill of Rights,
although "neither a full nor a final Bill of Rights,"75 identified an
extensive list of individual and group rights, made the rights
justiciable against the state and private actors, and explicitly
identified a very narrow set of circumstances in which the rights
could be overcome by other state priorities.76
The Technical Committee's first Progress Report in May 1993
identified some elements of its methodology for evaluating rights
for inclusion. All rights in the Interim Constitution's Bill of Rights
should "enjoy legitimacy among the vast majority of the
population so as to facilitate the legitimacy of similar means and
mechanisms" in the final Constitution's Bill of Rights. The starting
point was the Bill of Rights proposals already prepared by the
71. Id. at 40-42.
72. SUMMARY OF THE SECOND PROGRESS REPORT OF THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS DURING THE TRANSITION I (May 21, 1993), availabl at
http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/3202.PDF.
73. UNDERSTANDING, sufra note 17.
74. The sources for the Bill of Rights were both international rights documents and
foreign constitutions, with particular preference for more recent national documents,
"reflecting accumulated wisdom in international as well as domestic human rights
jurisprudence." Id. at 47. Throughout, the Committee remained essentially closed to
outside scrutiny (other than its reports to the senior representatives of the lead parties on
the Negotiating Council), but as the process advanced, the main parties weighed in on the
issue of the content of the enumerated rights. See id. at 49-51.
75. UNDERSTANDING, suna note 17, at 45.
76. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch.2, § 36 (1):
The rights of the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of
general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity,
equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors including a.
the nature of the right; b. the importance of the purpose of the limitation; c.
the nature and extent of the limitation; d. the relation between the
limitation and its purpose; and e. less restrictive means to achieve the
purpose.
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various negotiating parties (and others), so as to identify "areas of
agreement on minimal or essential fundamental rights and
freedoms which can simply not be excluded in the transitional
period."7 7
By the time the parties' draft proposals were submitted to the
Technical Committee, the Committee was able to identify
environmental rights as among those rights agreed to by the
various political parties.78 As a consequence, a slim version of the
eventual environmental right appeared in the first Technical
Committee report: "The right to an environment which is safe and
not detrimental to health."79 It was "formulated negatively and
therefore restrictively" because the Technical Committee believed
a more expansive right was more appropriately left for the more
complete drafting process that would occur during the transition
period.80 This right was identified as one of the agreed "minimal
or essential rights and freedoms which must be accommodated"
during the transitional period.81 Presumably because of this
narrow scope of the right, "no reference is made to a duty to act in
such a way that the environment remains ecologically
sustainable."8 2 Although the standards applicable to the
determination of which rights should be included in the interim
Bill of Rights went through several reformulations over the initial
months, the list of included rights varied little.83
Over the course of the six months during which the Technical
Committee met,8 4 the text of the environmental right changed
little-especially in comparison to most of the other proposed
rights.85 Early on, it took on the formulaic committee language,
77. TECHNICAL COMM. ON FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE TRANSITION, FIRST
PROGRESS REPORT §§ 2.1, 2.3 (May 14, 1993), available at http://www.constitutionnet.org/
files/3201.PDF.
78. 1(. § 4.
79. Id.
80. SUMMARY OF THE SECOND PROGRESS REPORT OF THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE TRANSITION (May 21, 1993), available at
http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/3202.PDF.
81. SUMMARY OF THE FIRST PROGRESS REPORT OF THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE TRANSITION (May 14, 1993), available at
http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/3201.PDF.
82. UNDERSTANDING, supra note 17, at 46.
83. Id. at 40-46.
84. The Technical Committee on Fundamental Rights in the Transition worked six
months from May 10, 1993 to November 18, 1993. Id. at 8-9.
85. Compare SUMMARY OF THE FIRST PROGRESS REPORT OF THE TECHNICAL
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"Every person shall have the right,"86 and relatively late in the
process, the description "safe and not detrimental" was changed
to merely "not detrimental."8 7 But the right, one of very few third
generation rights to be included in the interim Bill of Rights, was
never removed after its first inclusion.88 As stated by one member
of the Technical Committee, "Once listed, it was difficult for the
political negotiators to argue persuasively that the environment
did not need constitutional protection in the short term."89 Hence
the final text of the Interim Constitution that went into effect on
April 26, 1994 stated its promise of environmental rights in the
following manner: "[Section] 29. Every person shall have the right
to an environment which is not detrimental to his or her health or
well-being."90
The choice of the more constrained, "negative" phrasing of
the right served the purpose of not placing "too great a burden on
a future government, which was likely to be preoccupied with
urgent demands on the socioeconomic front."9' The use of
language that focused on the individual as the holder of the right
and echoed the social welfare protections that immediately
preceded it in the document was intentional, as well.92 The
affirmative obligations of such a right were assumed to be
appropriately left to the Constitutional Assembly to evaluate.93 In
his testimony before the Negotiating Committee, Technical
Committee convener Lourens du Plessis specifically stated that the
proposed text was not "the full spectrum of the environmental
rights" but rather "a basis on which further protection can be built
in the future. ... .T]he idea here was just to lay down certain basic
COMMITTEE ON FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE TRANSITION, available at
http://Wvw.constitutionnet.org/files/3201.PDF, with TECHNICAL COMM. ON
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE TRANSITION, ELEVENTH PROGRESS REPORT, available at
http://www.constititionnet.org/files/321 I.PDF.
86. TECHNICAL COMM. ON FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE TRANSITION, TENTH
PROGRESS REPORT, available at http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/3210.PDF.
87. Id.
88. Compare TECHNICAL COMM. ON FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE TRANSITION, FIRST
PROGRESS REPORT, available at http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/3201.PDF, wilh
TECHNICAL COMM. ON FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE TRANSITION, ELEVENTH PROGRESS
REPORT, available at http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/3211.PDF.
89. UNDERSTANDING, suna note 17, at 184.
90. S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST. 1993.
91. UNDERSTANDING, siupa note 17, at 184-85.
92. TECHNICAL COMM. ON FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE TRANSITION, FIFTH
PROGRESS REPORT, available at http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/3205.PDF.
93. UNDERSTANDING, sipra note 17, at 45-46.
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guidelines on which further elaboration would be possible in a
future [constitution]." 9 4
4. Environmental rights and the final Constitution.
When the new Constitutional Assembly began its work on the
final Constitution following the April 1994 elections, there was
little likelihood it would write a new constitution that differed
dramatically from the Interim Constitution. The Thirty-four
Principles circumscribed the field of allowable innovation. And the
Assembly was meeting as a regular legislature as well, passing new
laws and amending apartheid era laws, throughout this period.
Moreover, time was limited: the legislative body was only given two
years from its first post-election meeting to complete their task.
Failure to complete the draft would have required President
Mandela to dissolve Parliament and call a new general election 95-
an occurrence everyone sought to avoid. This pressure ensured
that attention was focused on the most highly disputed and
controversial topics, which did not include environmental rights.
Much of the drafting of the constitutional text happened in the
Constitutional Assembly's various theme committees with sign-off
required by the party-based negotiators on the core Constitutional
Committee.96 Theme Committee Four was charged with drafting
the Bill of Rights for the final Constitution.97
One of the earliest proposed change appeared in the Final
Report on Group and Human Rights drafted by the quasi-independent
South African Law Commission while the NP was still in power
under apartheid.98 The Final Report proposed that the Interim
Constitution provision should be altered to read: "Every person
94. MINUTES OF THE SIXTH PROGRESS REPORT OF THE THEME COMMITTEE ON
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE TRANSITION TO THE NEGOTIATING COUNCIL, available at
http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/332.PDF.
95. See S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST. 1993, ch. 5, § 73.
96. Theme committees were identified by number and had the following foci: (1)
character of state, (2) structure of state, (3) relations between levels of government, (4)
fundamental rights, (5) judiciary and legal systems and, (6) specialized structures. See
Jeremy Sarkin, The Drafting of South Africa's Final Constitution from a Human-Rights Perspective,
47 AM.J. COMP. L. 67, 70 n.23 (1999).
97. Id. The Committee met thirty-two times between September 19, 1994 and August
14, 1995 to discuss the content of the final Bill of Rights. The Constitutional Assembly,
Republic of South Africa, Second Annual Report of the ConstitutionalAssembly (1996), at *15.
98. SOUTH AFRICAN LAw COMMISSION FINAL REPORT ON GROUP AND HUMAN RIGHTS
PROJECT 58 (1994), SOUTH AFRICAN LAW COMMISSION INTERIM REPORT: GROUP AND
HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT 58 (1991).
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shall have the right to an environment which is not detrimental to
the public health or well-being. 9 This version presumably would
have protected people from large scale ecological harms rather
than incidents or practices that harmed individual health. The
Commission's commentary directly opposed the inclusion of rights
related to sustainable development and use or conservation. Such
rights, "like socioeconomic rights," are "not suitable for judicial
protection as a fundamental right."100 The proposal was not
adopted by the drafters despite some parties' expressed interest.'0
Instead, the environmental rights section of the interim
Constitution was expanded prior to disclosure of the first proposed
text of the final Constitution. The first draft of the final
Constitution kept similar language for the personal right to a
healthy environment, but added a second element regarding a
right to have the environment protected with specific reference to
pollution, conservation, and sustainable development. 0 2
Environmental rights were not much discussed in the Public
Participation Programme that was conducted alongside the formal
drafting process. They certainly did not elicit comments with the
frequency of hot-button social issues like abortion, lesbian and gay
equality or the death penalty. 0 Nevertheless, the Constitutional
Assembly reported receipt of 220 signatories to petitions
addressing environmental issues in the first phase of the Public
Participation Programme.104 (None were submitted in the
99. SOUTH AFRICAN LAw COMMISSION FINAL REPORT ON GROUP AND HUMAN RIGHTS
PROJEcT 58 (1994); SOUTH AFRIcAN LAW COMMISSION INTERIM REPORT: GROUP AND
HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT 58 (1991) (emphasis added); Vryheids Front [Freedom Front],
Submissions to the Theme Committee 4 (Fundamental Rights), 9-10, available at
http://www.constitutionnet.org /files/11882.PDF [hereinafter Vryheids Front]
(containing political party comments on proposed fundamental rights in the final
constitution).
100. SOUTH AFRICAN LAW COMMISSION FINAL REPORT ON GROUP AND HUMAN
RIGHTS PROJEcT 58 (1994) (quoting Hugh Corder, ed., A CHARTER FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE: A
CONTRIBUTION TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN BILL OF RIGHTS DEBATE 52 (University of Cape
Town, 1992)).
101. Vryheids Front, supra note 99, at 9-10 (containing political party comments on
proposed fundamental rights in the final constitution).
102. Michael Kidd, Environmental Rights, 7 S. AFR. HUM. RTS. Y. B. 102 (1996).
103. Eric C. Christiansen, Ending the Apartheid of the Closet: Sexual Orientation in the
Soith African Constitutional Process, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & Pol. 997, 1039-40 (2000). This is
supported by research into public opinion at the time the Constitution was being drafted.
HENNIE KOTZE, THE WORKING DRAFT OF SOUTH AFRICA'S 1996 CONSTITUTION: ELITE AND
PUBLIC ATTITUDES TO THE "OPTIONS" (1996).
104. The Constitutional Assembly, Republic of South Africa, Second Annial Report of
the Constitutional Assembly, 1996 (copy on file with author).
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somewhat limited second phase.)
The only later alterations appear as an NP proposal in the
fourth draft of the final Constitution. The proposed changes, most
of which were accepted, primarily addressed the 24(b)
provision. 105 The accepted proposals included the addition of
language indicating the required protections were "for the benefit
of present and future generations" and modification of the
reference to sustainable development. The initially proposed
sustainability element, which required the state to "secure
sustainable development and use of natural resources," was
clarified and expanded in the final draft to require the state to
"secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural
resources while promoting justifiable economic and social
development." 
0 6
Official Constitutional Assembly discussion of the proposed
text occurred at the debates during the two "readings" of the
legislative bill that proposed the final Constitution. Environmental
rights were barely mentioned. A bland comment, "[w]e are
pleased about the fact that our Bill of Rights has defined human
rights as meaning not only political rights, but also social,
economic, and environmental rights," typifies the few opinions
expressed about the environmental provisions.107 No express
opposition was voiced regarding the inclusion of either element of
105. At the time, environmental rights were still in Section 23. An additional
proposal of the National Party to add a "quality of life" reference was rejected. The
entirely of the NP proposal in the fourth draft was:
Everyone has the right -
(1) to an environment that is not harmful to their health, well-being and quality
of life, and
(2) to have their environment protected through reasonable legislative and
other measures for the benefit of present and future generations -
(a) preventing pollution and ecological degradation;
(b) promoting conservation;
(c) securing the ecologically sustainable use of natural resources;
(d) safeguarding the environment while promoting justifiable economic
development; and
(e) securing the ecological integrity of the environment.
Fourth Draft of the 1996 Constitution (March 20, 1996), ch. 2, § 23, (S. Afr.), available at
http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/4CA18036.PDF.
106. Compare Fourth Draft of S. AFR. CONST. (March 20, 1996), ch. 2, § 23, available at
http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/4CAl8036.PDF, with S. AFR CONST, 1996, ch. 2, § 24.
107. See 3 DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY, REP. OF S. AFR. 108 (Apr. 23,
1996) (Comment of Mrs. P De Lille).
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the final Constitution's environmental rights.
Similarly, there was no significant discussion during the second
reading of the Constitution either. 08 The last remark on
environmental rights was voiced on the final day of discussion
before the proposed text of the Constitution was submitted: "the
Bill of Rights guarantees the protection not just of those now
living, but also of many generations to come through the right to
have the environment protected against pollution and
degradation."109 There is no record of any noteworthy response,
nor any formal opposition to the environmental provisions.
When the final text was adopted by overwhelming majorities in
both houses of Parliament on May 8, 1996, it included substantially
expanded environmental rights. The retention and expansion of
environmental rights language in the proposed text of the final
Constitution was not in and of itself remarkable; a significant
number of rights were expanded and several categories of
constitutional protection were added that had not been
mentioned in the Interim Constitution at all.110 The new provisions
included prohibitions on government and private actors, as well as
broad affirmative duties for all levels of government related to a
clean and healthy environment and sustainable development."'
The entire text of the Constitution was then sent to the
Constitutional Court for certification.
5. Constitutional Court certification.
The Court's initial certification opinion was announced on
September 6, 1996.112 In whatJustice Albie Sachs later identified as
a "unique jurisprudential and political event in the world,"" 3 the
108. See 3 DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY, REP. OF S. AFR. 188 (Apr. 24,
1996) (Conument of Ms Y. L. Myakayaka-Manzini).
109. See 3 DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY, REP. OF S. AFR. 156 (Oct. 11,
1996) (Comment of M.A. Stofile).
110. Cornfmire S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST., 1993, ch. 3, with S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. 2.
111. See 3 DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY, REP. OF S. AFR. 447-50 (May 8,
1996). Only one party, the African Christian Democratic Party, voted against the text (with
two votes). The Freedom Front, a white right-wing party, abstained from the vote (with 12
votes). Id.
112. Five major political parties submitted written documentation as (lid eighty-four
other organizations and individuals. From these written objections-2,500 pages in
total-individual speakers and organizational representatives addressed the Court at the
oral arguments held July 1-11, 1996. Representatives of the Constitutional Assembly had
the opportunity to respond to each objection. See Certification I, supra note 34, at ch. 1, § D.
113. Albie Sachs, The Crealion ofSSouth Africa's Constilution, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 669,
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South African Constitutional Court declared the South African
Constitution to be "unconstitutional."ll 4 While acknowledging
that the drafting marked a "monumental achievement" and that
"in general and in the majority of its provisions" the Assembly had
succeeded, the Court nevertheless concluded that "the [proposed
Constitution] cannot be certified as it stands because there are
several respects in which there has been noncompliance" with the
Thirty-four Principles." 5
Environmental rights were not the basis for any significant
direct discussion in the Certification I decision. Although some
objections to the proposed text of the Constitution's
environmental rights provision were noted," 6 the Court deferred,
citing its limited role in the drafting exercise. As the Court
explained:
There were a variety of other objections to provisions in and
omissions from the Bill of Rights. . . . We repeat that it is not for
us but for the [Constitutional Assembly], the duly mandated
agent of the electorate, to determine-within the boundaries of
the [Constitutional Principles] -which provisions to include in
the Bill of Rights and which not. We can accordingly express no
view on the merits, or otherwise, of the objections which
advocated ... amendments to the sections dealing with equality,
affirmative action, privacy, [and] the environment." 7
The assertions of non-compliance that relate indirectly to
environmental protections included a challenge to the inclusion of
rights that were not common to most modern constitutions, a
description that fairly describes enforceable environmental rights
in the 1990s. The basis for this challenge was Constitutional
Principle II, which stated that "[elveryone shall enjoy all
universally accepted fundamental rights, freedoms and civil
669 (1997).
114. Id.
115. Certification I, supra note 34, at ch.1, § F. In a lengthy opinion, the Constitutional
Court identified nine components of the May 1996 draft of the Constitution that failed to
comply adequately with the Thirty-four Principles-including problems with labor rights,
the independence and impartiality of government oversight mechanisms, and fiscal and
structural inadequacies regarding local government. See Certification I, supra note 34, at chs.
6,8.
116. Certification I, supra note 34, para. 282.
117. Certification 1, supra note 34, para. 104.
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liberties."" 8 Clearly, the proposed Bill of Rights, with its extensive
social welfare rights and its expansive environmental protections,
included a greater number of rights than those that could fairly be
labeled as "universally accepted."
The Court addressed this objection to the expansion of the
interim Bill of Rights in an early part of its opinion:
It is clear that the drafters intended that only those rights that
have gained a wide measure of international acceptance as
fundamental human rights must necessarily be included in the
[final Constitution]. Beyond that prescription, the
[Constitutional Assembly] enjoys a discretion. That this is the
case is apparent too from the instruction given in the closing
clause of [Constitutional Principle] II which requires [the
Assembly] to give due consideration to inter alia the fundamental
rights contained in [the Interim Bill of Rights]. The [Assembly]
was clearly not obliged to duplicate those rights, nor to match
them. They merely had to be duly considered."19
Essentially, the Constitutional Principles created a floor of
minimum rights requirements but set no ceiling on the work of
the Constitutional Assembly.
The environment is otherwise mentioned only in discussions,
generally approving, of the division and sharing of legislative
competency between the national, provincial, and local levels of
government. The Court cited the inclusion of environmental
protection authority in the sphere of provincial 20 and local
authority121 as evidence of the significant power granted to the
lower levels of government-something required by Constitutional
Principle XXI. 122 Of the other issues in the proposed constitutional
text, none were related significantly to environmental rights.
Nevertheless, other,. unrelated "inconsistencies" with the
118. S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST., 1993, Schedule 4, Principle II. ("Everyone shall enjoy
all universally accepted fundamental rights, freedoms and civil liberties, which shall be
provided for and protected by entrenched and justiciable provisions in the Constitution,
which shall be drafted after having given due consideration to inter alia the fundamental
rights contained in Chapter 3 of this Constitution.").
119. Cerijication I, supra note 34, para. 51.
120. Cerification I, supra note 34, para. 252.
121. CerlfIication I, supra note 34, paras. 475-76. This shared authority was the basis
for one of the Constitutional Court's most recent environmental law cases, Maccsand (Ply)
Ltd. v. City of Cape Town 2012 (4) SA 181 (CC) (S. Afr.), discussed below.
122. S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST., 1993, Schedule 4, Principle XXI.
2013] 241
STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LA WJOURNAL
Constitutional Principles were identified by the Court. 2 3
Consistent with its ruling, the Court returned the text to the
Constitutional Assembly for revision. When the amended text
returned to the Court in October 1996,124 the Court focused
exclusively on its originally identified "grounds for non-
certification" identified in the Certification I judgment. Hence,
environmental rights were not addressed other than indirectly in
changes effecting all constitutional rights. The Court's Certification
Ilopinion noted a suggestion from a private commentator that the
text of the right could be clarified but declared that suggestion
(and many others) "properly within the province of the
[Constitutional Assembly's] political judgment" and thus not
subject to review by the Court in its capacity as certifier. 125
The amended text was approved by the Constitutional Court
on December 4, 1996.126 On December 10, 1996, Human Rights
Day, the new Constitution was signed by President Mandela.
III. THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO A
CLEAN AND HEALTHFUL ENVIRONMENT
A. Section 24: The Right to a Clean Environment
The final approved text of the Constitution included a
substantial, multi-element environmental right. Section 24 of the
South African Constitution states:
Everyone has the right
(a) to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-
being; and
123. See Certification I, supra note 34.
124. The comment was that the Section 24 right "should include a concise
formulation of how 'pollution and ecological. (environmental) degradation' is to be
prevented and controlled." CERTIFICATION OF THE AMENDED TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA 1997 (2) SA 97 (CC) Annexure 1: Summary of
Objections and Submissions, 125.
125. Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1997
(2) SA 97 (CC), para. 14. The comment was that the Section 24 right "should include a
concise formulation of how "pollution and ecological (environmental) degradation" is to
be prevented and controlled." Id. at, Annexure 1: Summary of Objections and
Submissions, para. 3.
126. Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South Affica,
1997 (2) SA 97 (CC), para. 205 ("We certify that all the provisions of the amended
constitutional text, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, passed by the
Constitutional Assembly on 11 October 1996, comply with the Constitutional Principles
contained in schedule 4 to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993.").
242 [Vol. 32: 215
SOUTH AFRICAN ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS
(b) to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present
and future generations, through reasonable legislative and other
measures that
(i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation;
(ii) promote conservation; and
(iii) secure ecologically sustainable development and use of
natural resources while promoting justifiable economic and
social development.
It formally took effect on February 4, 1997127 and has not been
amended since that time.128
1. The rights in section 24.
Section 24 has a natural division between subsection (a), the
healthful environment element, and subsection (b), the
environmental protection element. Both sections share a common
introductory phrase-"Everyone has the right"-which mirrors
the language of the civil and political rights and socioeconomic
rights in the Constitution. Needless to say, the two elements are
intended to be read and interpreted in conjunction with one
another-and with the remainder of the Constitution. This Article
will first review the meaning of the textual protections themselves
before discussing the Constitutional Court's enforcement in their
primary environmental opinions.
Section 24(a) announces that everyone has a right "to an
environment that is not harmful to their [sic] health or well-
being."' 2 9 This is the more common, anthropocentric component
of constitutional environmental rights protection globally,s 0
directly enforced in some countries and indirectly enforced in
other countries as a necessary component of the constitutional
"right to life."
Section 24(b) is slightly more textually complex and includes
127. See Lionel Williams, South Afiica's New Constitution Takes IFfec Today, AFR. NEWS
SERVICE (Feb. 4, 1997).
128. Amendments are listed and noted in text on the website for the Constitutional
Court of South Africa, http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/constitution/english-




129. S. AFR. CONST.,1996, ch. 2, §24(a).
130. Bovo, sufnra note 1, at 59-63.
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both anthropocentric and ecocentric characteristics. It somewhat
awkwardly proclaims a right "to have the environment protected,
for the benefit of present and future generations, through
reasonable legislative and other measures that (i) prevent
pollution and ecological degradation; (ii) promote conservation;
and (iii) secure ecologically sustainable development and use of
natural resources while promoting justifiable economic and social
development." 
3 1
The environmental protection element of Section 24 is
phrased as an individual right: each person "has the right to have
the environment protected," which supports the enforceability of
the element's prohibitions against government action. This
constitutional circumlocution is only present in Section 24. It is
unclear why the drafters did not follow the alternative model of
the Section 34 right to just administrative action, which directly
requires, "National legislation must be enacted to give effect to
these rights."13 2 Perhaps it is because both national and provincial
legislation is required and significant executive action (also at both
the national and provincial level) as well. Moreover, because of the
horizontal applicability of Section 24, the phrasing may be
intended to highlight the broad variety of protective measures-
legislative and executive, national and provincial, public and
private-that may be necessary to protect the environment.
Section 24(b) creates a government duty by creating a private
right to environmentally-protective outcomes from the legislative
and executive branches of government. The text creates a private
claim against government inaction or against government action
that is inconsistent with the protective duties of Section 24.. This
element includes both negative duties, preventing "pollution and
ecological degradation," 3 3 and affirmative commands, to
"promote conservation" and to "secure . . . sustainable
development and use of natural resources." On its face these
components of the right-at least when paired with the expansive
powers of the South African judiciary-provide the potential for
numerous and substantial assertions of noncompliance when the
environment is threatened because of inaction (or inadequate or
improper action) by government.
Because Section 24 should be read in conjunction with Section
131. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. 2, §24(b).
132. Id. atch. 2, §33.
133. Id. at ch. 2, §24.
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8(2), the environmental responsibilities and duties apply
horizontally as well as vertically: they apply to private individual or
corporate actions as well as governmental action.134 A significant,
as yet undeveloped, area of law results from the ostensibly
enforceable obligations placed on private and corporate
persons-including mining companies, companies using
suboptimal means to avoid environmental degradation, and those
otherwise damaging the environment or pursuing unsustainable
development practices. The South Mrican Constitution tempers
the rights in the environmental protection element of Section 24
with at least two caveats: a reasonableness qualification that may
provide common sense limits on expectations of government
actors and the acknowledgement that state policies will continue to
promote 'justifiable economic and social development."13 5
These potentially mitigating textual elements are not unique to
environmental rights. A version of the reasonableness limitation
appears multiple times in the Constitution, typically in the social
welfare rights provisions. Most social welfare rights include the
caveat, "The state must take reasonable legislative and other
measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive
realisation of this right."136  In its social welfare rights
jurisprudence, the Court has found this phrasing to mean that
government officials must take some direct action to address the
core constitutional concerns of the particular provision and that
care must be taken to address the needs of those most harmed by
unavailability of the right.137 The "while promoting justifiable
economic and social development" language could have been
interpreted to qualify the commitment to environmental
protection and affirm the constitutionality of pursuing increased
private wealth and public development. 38 But as we shall see, this
part of Section 24 is less a limitation and more a reiteration of the
goal of express promotion of sustainable development as a model
134. Id. atch. 2, §8(2).
135. Id.
136. Id. atch. 2, §26(2).
137. Eric C. Christiansen, Adjudicating Non-justiciable Rights: Socio-Economic Rights and
the Sauth African Constitutional Coutt, 38 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 321, 375-76 (2007).
138. There is in fact a different textual model in the South Mrican Constitution for
concerns about expenses associated with governmental burdens. Section 32, which
provides for access to information states that "[n]ational legislation must be enacted to
give effect to this right, and may provide for reasonable measures to alleviate the tinancial
and administrative burdens on the state." S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 2, §32(2).
2013] 245
246 STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LA WJOURIVAL
for future economic development.
2. Section 24 and the Bill of Rights.
Section 24 follows the general model of the various rights
provisions in the South African Constitution's Bill of Rights. In 36
sections, including framing provisions with instructions on the
meaning, purpose, and proper interpretation of its rights, the
South African Bill of Rights protects a panoply of rights-
traditional civil and political rights, second generation social
welfare rights, and third generation rights including
environmental rights, labor rights, and rights related to "cultural,
religious and linguistic" communities. 139
The Bill of Rights, Chapter II of the Constitution, prefaces the
list of protected rights with sections discussing the significance and
applicability of all rights in the Constitution. While environmental
rights do not have special significance (unlike the core values of
dignity, equality, and freedom),140 they are drafted so as to be
equal to all the other rights. The rights in the Bill of Rights are the
"cornerstone of democracy in South Africa." 141 The consequence
of this, stated early and prominently in the Constitution is that
"law or conduct inconsistent with [the Constitution] is invalid, and
the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled." 42  This
command-with both negative and positive elements-is so
fundamental that it is reiterated in the first section of the Bill of
Rights: "The state must respect, protect, promote, and fulfill the
rights in the Bill of Rights."143 In those early sections the
Constitution makes it clear that its commands and prohibitions
apply "to all law, and bind the legislature, the executive, the
judiciary and all organs of state."
Moreover, the Bill of Rights specifically binds private actors-
not just government actors. Section 8(2) states that the Bill of
Rights provisions bind "a natural or juristic person" where
139. Id. atch. 2, §§ 23, 30, 31.
140. Id. at ch. 2, §7 ("This Bill of Rights is a cornerstone of democracy in South
Africa. It enshrines the rights of all people in our country and affirms the democratic
values of human dignity, equality and freedom."); id. at ch. 2, §36 ("The rights in the Bill
of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the extent that the
limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human
dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors . . . .
141. Id. at ch. 2, §7.
142. Id. at ch. 1, §2.
143. Id. at ch. 2, §7.
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"applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the
nature of the duty imposed."1' Both the inclusion of affirmative
obligations on state organs and the extension of restrictions to
private actors are likely to be critical innovations in South Africa's
constitutional enforcement of environmental rights.
Following the list of rights, Chapter II includes two additional
sections directed at enforcement of the Bill of Rights. Section
39(a) guides the interpretation of the rights, requiring that rights
be interpreted in a manner that will "promote the values that
underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity,
equality, and freedom." Section 39(b) facilitates this by requiring
consideration of international law (something decidedly relevant
for environmental rights) and expressly permitting the
consideration of foreign law.' 45 Environmental rights, like all rights
in the.South African Constitution, are also subject to potential
limitations under Section 36. The "limitations clause" only allows
restrictions on express constitutional rights where the limits derive
from a "law of general application" and only "to the extent that
the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom,
taking into account all relevant factors." 4 6
144. Id. at ch. 2, §8:
(1) The Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the executive,
thejudiciary and all organs of state.
(2) A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or ajuristic person if, and to
the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and
the nature of any duty imposed by the right.
(3) When applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural orjuristic person
in terms of subsection (2), a court-
(a) in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or if necessary
develop, the common law to the extent that legislation does not give effect
to that right; and
(b) may develop rules of the common law to limit the right, provided that the
limitation is in accordance with section 36(1).
(4) A juristic person is entitled to the rights in the Bill of Rights to the extent
required by the nature of the rights and the nature of thatjuristic person."
145. Id. at ch. 2, § 39(1) ("When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or
forum (a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on
human dignity, equality and freedom; (b) must consider international law; and
(c) may consider foreign law.").
146. Id. at ch. 2, §36 (asserting that the "relevant factors" include "(a) the nature of
the right; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent
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The placement and framing of environmental rights signifies
the essential equality of environmental rights within the scheme of
constitutional rights protection in South Africa. Functionally,
environmental rights contain both positive and negative aspects,
are broadly enforceable, and are intended to be expansively
interpreted in line with the values of the post-apartheid
constitutional values.
B. Section 24 at the Constitutional Court
Before discussing the Court's core environmental cases, the
section below presents some of the uncommon characteristics of
the Constitutional Court's procedural powers that enable its
environmental jurisprudence. Many of these elements specifically
empower the Court to effectively address the justiciability concerns
that would otherwise arise for environmental plaintiffs in other
nations' courts.
1. A uniquely empowered court.
The Constitution vested broad judicial review authority in the
courts of South Africa generally and the South African
Constitutional Court specifically-including the power to review
proposed legislation, national and provincial statutes, provincial
constitutions, acts of the executive branch and administrative
bodies, and decisions of lower courts on all matters related to the
Constitution.14 7 At its creation, the Constitutional Court was
positioned atop the preexisting (that is to say, apartheid-era) legal
system and empowered to oversee, guide, and correct lower courts,
which were newly empowered by a transformational value set. By
creating a new, capstone judicial body, one untarnished by an
apartheid history, South Africa was able to maintain its established
legal system with experienced judicial officers without sacrificing
of the limitation; (d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and (e) less
restrictive means to achieve the purpose.").
147. Id. at ch. 8, § 167. However, other courts are empowered to review the
constitutionality of legislative or executive acts. Id. § 172(2) (a):
The Supreme Court of Appeal, a High Court or a court of similar status may
make an order concerning the constitutional validity of an Act of Parliament, a
provincial Act or any conduct of the President, but an order of constitutional
invalidity has no force unless it is confirmed by the Constitutional Court.
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the transformative goals of equality, dignity, and freedom.148
As a result, the South African Constitutional Court was the
branch of government that was undeniably the first among equals
at the conclusion of the constitutional transition. The Court's
expansive powers come from institutional characteristics as much
as from the generous enumeration of rights in the constitutional
text. The Court has very broad jurisdiction over constitutional
matters and has far-reaching remedial powers. Additionally, access
to the Court is multi-form and generally permissive. These
procedural characteristics form a critical aspect of the power and
authority of the judiciary and the Court. As will be seen in the
discussion below, the Court's powers are demonstrated in its
environmental cases and many of its uncommon characteristics are
particularly impactful on environmental rights adjudication.
a. Institutional access.
The central role of the Court is to oversee the application of
the Constitution by lower courts and review the constitutionality of
the acts of the other governmental bodies and state actors.149 This
purpose is supported by open access to the judicial system
generally and broad capacity of the Constitutional Court to decide
particular issues. Generally speaking, standing rules for plaintiffs,
such as access generally to the court system, as well as the specific
rules of access to the Constitutional Court itself, are discretionary
and permissive.o50 The access provisions include an exceptionally
broad standing clause, which allows anyone "acting in their own
interest ... on behalf of another person who cannot act in their
own name ... as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or
class of persons . . . anyone acting in the public interest [or] . . . an
association acting in the interest of its members" to bring suit in "a
competent court, alleging that a right in the Bill of Rights has been
infringed or threatened, and the court may grant appropriate
relief." 151
The constitutional grant of access for such plaintiffs extends
well beyond the commonly-included classes of persons with
148. Constitutional Court of South Africa, Ilistoy of the Court,
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/thecour1-t/h istoiy.htm (last visited Sept. 30,
2012).
149. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 8, § 167(4).




immediate remediable harms, thus offering unquestionably
greater access than most courts.'52 These standing provisions seem
to anticipate the practical difficulties for many potential plaintiffs.
The express allowance of access for "anyone acting . . . in the
interest of . .. a group or class of persons" or "anyone acting in
the public interest" 53 seems to be an open invitation to anyone
with resources to advance the interests of those without-a critical
concern in a nation where issues of poverty, historical
discrimination, and poor education would otherwise inhibit access
to the justice system. The result is that a far greater number of
concerns may be brought to the attention of South African
courts-assisting the Court's role as supervisor of all governmental
action and granting it more opportunities to facilitate
transformation. These capacious provisions effectively remove the
issue of standing as an obstacle to constitutional adjudication-a
particularly important development for environmental cases.
As far as traditional, subject matter jurisdictional issues are
concerned, the Constitutional Court "is the highest court in all
constitutional matters," 154 such as "any issue involving the
interpretation, protection, or enforcement of the Constitution." 
5 5
And, the Court itself has exclusive competence to decide the
jurisdictional appropriateness of any issue before it.156 The
enumerated environmental rights of Section 24 place
environmental issues squarely within the purview of the
Constitutional Court.
b. Remedial Authority
As with the laws regarding access to the courts and its
jurisdictional grant, the remedial powers of the Constitutional
Court (and the South African courts generally) are very broad-
both in initial grant and in their interpretation by the Court itself.
Section 172 of the Constitution states: "When deciding a
constitutional matter within its power, a court (a) must declare
that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is
152. Consider, for example, the American standing requirements of injury,
causation, redressability, as well as the judicially-created elements of standing, drawn from
the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
153. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 2, § 38.
154. Id. at ch. 8, § 167(3).
155. Id. § 167(7).
156. Id. § 167(3).
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invalid to the extent of its inconsistency; and (b) may make any
order that is just and equitable." 57
These provisions stress the two, often distinct, aspects of
remedies in constitutional cases: the reviewing court must
invalidate actions or laws it finds to be unconstitutional, and it may
make any 'just and equitable" remedial order to the successful
party. The mandatory element ensures the enforcement of the new
constitutional values-and is a requirement notably placed on all
courts, not just on the Constitutional Court. The permissive
element allows great latitude for the courts to ensure their
remedies adequately address successful claims.
Indeed, the Court has declared that it has all the necessary
powers to fashion any appropriate remedy. 58 In selecting a
remedy, the requisite balancing will include weighing: (1) the
objective of the remedy ("to address the wrong occasioned by the
infringement"); (2) the value of deterrence of future violations of
the right; (3) realistic compliance issues; and (4) fairness to all
affected.159 South Mrica's history of human rights violations and
the practical difficulty of bringing cases to the Constitutional Court
are presented as justifications for generous remedies in human
rights cases:
[T]his Court has a particular duty to ensure that, within the
bounds of the Constitution, effective relief be granted for any of
the rights entrenched in it. In our context an appropriate
remedy must mean an effective remedy, for without effective
remedies for breach, the values underlying and the rights
entrenched in the Constitution cannot properly be upheld or
enhanced.160
The Court's judgments often portray its remedial power as the
core of its constitutional duty. And the Court's authority and
obligation to produce just remedies requires the justices to seek
nontraditional solutions:
157. Id. § 172(1).
158. Iloffann v. S. African Ainvays 2000 (1) SA I (CC) para. 42 (S. Afr.), available al
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2000/17.pdf.
159. Id.
160. Fose v. Minisler of Safetly and Sec. 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC) para. 69 (S. Aft.), available
atl http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/1997/6.pdf.
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Depending on the circumstances of each particular case the
relief may be a declaration of rights, an interdict, a mandamus,
or such other relief as may be required to ensure that the rights
enshrined in the Constitution are protected and enforced. If it is
necessary to do so, the courts may even have to fashion new
remedies to secure the protection and enforcement of these all
important rights.' 6'
For environmental cases, the breadth of the remedial options
means that the courts have wide-ranging authority to creatively
address ecological harm, permanently alter inadequate processes,
or otherwise design a remedy to address novel environmental
situations.
Nevertheless, neither the critical importance of the remedial
power to the Court nor the statements of the Court that it must
"strike effectively" at the source of the "constitutional
infringement" has meant that there are not principled limitations
on the remedies granted.'62 Section 172 has not provided fodder
for unrestrained liberality on the part of the Court. Most
particularly, remedies related to substantial expenditures of state
resources have evoked caution from the Court: "The court would
not lightly make an order the effect of which would be to grossly
distort the financial affairs of [the state]."s63 Indeed, the Court
occasionally appears to be looking over its shoulder at a long line
of potential claimants to any immediate remedy and adjudicating
161. Id. para. 19; see also Hoffmann 2000 (1) SA para. 45 (describing the process for
fashioning appropriate relief):
The determination of appropriate relief, therefore, calls for the balancing of the
various interests that might be affected by the remedy. The balancing process
must at least be guided by the objective, first, to address the wrong occasioned by
the infringement of the constitutional right; second, to deter future violations;
third, to make an order that can be complied with; and fourth, of fairness to all
those who might be affected by the relief. Invariably, the nature of the right
infringed and the nature of the infringement will provide guidance as to the
.appropriate relief in the particular case.
162. Fose 1997 (3) SA para. 96. On occasion, under authority of the Constitution, the
Court has made exceptions to this rule-or to the normal non-retroactivity ofjudgments
generally-as required by interests of justice. The Constitution grants this authority. S.
AFR. CONST. 1996, sched. 6, § 16(6)(a).
163. Tsotetsi v Mut. & Fed. Ins. Co. 1997 (1) SA 585 (CC) para. 9 (S. Mr.). But see State
v. Bhulwana 1996 (1) SA 388 (CC) para. 399 (S. Mr.) ("It is only when the interests of
good government outweigh the interests of the individual litigants that the Court will not
grant relief.").
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its orders accordingly.'6
2. Constitutional Court case law.
Like many nations, South Africa has both a Constitutional
Court, a body with original and appellate jurisdiction on
constitutional matters, and a Supreme Court of Appeals, which is
the highest court for all non-constitutional appeals.'65 The
Constitutional Court is "the highest court for constitutional
matters" and hears only cases "involving the interpretation,
protection, or enforcement of the Constitution." 166 Because of this
division, this Article focuses exclusively on the case law of the
Constitutional Court. Although many important environmental
law cases are brought before the Supreme Court of Appeal (and
the trial-level High Courts and other, specialized courts), those
cases that go on to the Constitutional Court are the cases with the
most noteworthy constitutional bases and significant legal
arguments.
a. Fuel Retailers.
The 2007 case, Fuel Retailers Association of Southern Africa v.
Director-General Environmental Management, Mpumalanga Province,
came to the Constitutional Court as'a review of decisions regarding
the siting of a gasoline filling station on land that included a
portion of a known aquifer.'67 The case provided the Court with
the opportunity to elaborate on the "nature and scope of the
obligations of environmental authorities when they make decisions
that may have a substantial detrimental impact on the
environment" with particular attention to "the interaction
between social and economic development and the protection of
164. The Court's remedial authority also extends to the awarding of costs. Costs will
be considered cautiously in order to balance promotion of legitimate rights litigation and
discouragement of frivolous suits. See Motsepe v. Comm'rfior Idand Revenue 1997 (6) BCLR
692 (CC) para. 30 (S. Afr.). Notably, the Court has also sought to avoid the "chilling"
effect of imposing costs against citizen litigants who have sought to uphold their right
against the state. Id.
165. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 8, §§ 166-68; id. at § 168(3) ("Supreme Court of
Appeal may decide appeals in any matter. It is the highest court of appeal except in
constitutional matters . . . .").
166. Id. at ch. 8, §§ 167(3)-(4).
167. Fuel Retailers Ass'n of S. Ai: v. Dirtor-General Eriil. MgmI, 2007 (10) BCLR 1059
(CC) paras. 8-10 (S. Mr.).
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the environment." 6 8 Fuel Retailers is important for two reasons: its
explanation of the proper functioning of national environmental
legislation and its discussion of the relationship between
environmental protection and development.
i. Constitutionalizing environmental statutes.
The Court specifically identifies the 1998 National
Environmental Management Act (NEMA)1 69 as derived from
Section 24 of the Constitution; it is a detailed, practical expression
in statutory law of the imprecise principles in the Constitution. 70
Its interpretation is therefore within the purview of the
Constitutional Court, rather than merely under the Supreme
Court of Appeal as regular legislation.' 7 ' Because the principles
identified in Section 2 of NEMA "apply ... to the actions of all
organs of state that may significantly affect the environment," the
statute is without doubt the primary means through which the
Section 24 environmental rights influence and guide government
decision-making and state action. The NEMA guidelines
provide not only the general framework within which
environmental management and implementation decisions must
be formulated, but they also provide guidelines that should guide
State organs in the exercise of their functions that may affect the
environment. Perhaps more importantly, these principles provide
guidance for the interpretation and implementation not only of
NEMA but any other legislation that is concerned with the
protection and management of the environment. 72
Thus, NEMA informs the protection and enforcement of Section
24 rights in a host of environmental statutes. The Constitution
imbues NEMA with authority and NEMA defines and clarifies the
appropriate expression of that authority in all other environmental
legislation.
168. Id. para. 1.
169. Nat'I Envtl. Mgmt. Act 107 of 1998 (S. Afr.) [hereinafter NEMA].
170. Fuel Retailers, 2007 (10) BCLR 1059, para. 59.
171. The Supreme Court of Appeal is the highest court of appeal in South Africa
except where "constitutional matters" are concerned; the Constitution allows direct or
appellate access to the Constitutional Court when the issue involves "the interpretation,
protection, or enforcement of the Constitution." S. AFR. CONST. 1996, ch. 8, § 167.
172. Fuel Retailers, 2007 (10) BCLR 1059 para. 67.
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The Environmental Conservation Act (ECA), 73 the primary
environmental legislation of the waning years of the apartheid era,
is the basis for a relatively standard process for ensuring
developments with environmental impact are properly evaluated
by government authorities. The ECA "forbids any person from
undertaking an activity that . .. may have a substantial detrimental
impact on the environment without written authorisation by the
competent authority."1 74 A report on environmental impacts is
required and the authorizing official has authority to impose any
necessary conditions to protect the environment. 75
In Fuel Retailers, the Court overturned the determination of
local authorities to permit a gas station because the local officials
"took a narrow view of their obligations and misconstrued" their
duties under NEMA and ECA when considered in light of Section
24 of the Constitution. 76 The environmental authorities viewed
their task in too limited a fashion: merely to ensure some entity at
some level of government (here, the local municipality) had
reviewed the "need and desirability" of the project: 77 The
Constitutional Court offered a more purposive approach to
interpretation of the constitutional protections. The Court's
broader view requires authorities to make a serious assessment of
current circumstances with a "thorough investigation" of possible
"environmental and socioeconomic harms."178 Because over-
proliferation or economically unviable filling stations can cause
additional harms, the "need for development must now be
determined by its impact on the environment, sustainable
development and social and economic interests."' 79 Each
component is a "mandatory and material condition" 80 that must
be assessed before a particular development is ''environmentally
justifiable." 181
Further, the Court stressed that local authorities were not
entitled to avoid mitigation or protection against consequences
merely because the harms were of undetermined likelihood.
173. Envtl. Conservation Act (1989) (S. Aft.).
174. Id. § 2.
175. Id.
176. Fuel Retailers, 2007 (10) BCLR 1059 para. 97.
177. Id. para. 82.
178. Id. para. 81.
179. Id. para. 79.
180. Id. para. 89.
181. Id. para 85.
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Specifically, the Court held that the authorities in Fuel Retailers
"did not seem to take seriously the threat of contamination to
[ground water]. The precautionary principle required these
authorities to insist on adequate precautionary measures ...
[even] where, due to unavailable scientific knowledge, there is
uncertainty as to the future impact of the proposed
development."18 2 Decision-makers should take a "risk averse and
cautious approach" to assessing the "cumulative impact of a
development." 8 3
ii. Constitutionalizing sustainability.
The Fuel Retailers case is also a particularly relevant case for the
Court's examination of the "interrelationship between the
environment and development," a tension familiar to all nations
but more acutely felt by developing countries. 84 In language
clearly reminiscent of social welfare rights cases, the Court
expressly asserts the importance of development-traditionally an
indication that a court intends to enfeeble the relevant
environmental protections. "What is immediately apparent from
section 24 is the explicit recognition of the obligation to promote
justifiable 'economic and social development' . . . essential to the
well-being of human beings."18 5
But in Fuel Retailers the Court is not edifying development at
the cost of environmental protection. Rather the Court's
discussion of development in the text of the environmental right
intends to harness the notions together by means of their shared
goal: benefits for human beings, constitutional welfare in a
broader sense.
This Court has recognised that the socioeconomic rights that are
set out in the Constitution are indeed vital to the enjoyment of
other human rights guaranteed in the Constitution. But
development cannot subsist upon a deteriorating environmental
base. Unlimited development is detrimental to the environment
and the destruction of the environment is detrimental to
development. Promotion of development requires the protection
of the environment.
182. Id. para. 98.
183. Id. para. 81.
184. Id. para. 45.
185. Id. para. 44.
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Thereby the Court attempts to join environmental protection
and economic development rather than portray them as opposing
forces. But the Court's reliance on the common purpose of
development and environmentalism explains only why they are
linked, not how they can act in concert. It is more common to
picture environmental protection and economic development in
tension-one can succeed only where it eclipses the other.
Nevertheless, the Constitution "requires those who enforce and
implement [it] to find a balance between potentially conflicting
principles." 186
This tension was known by the authors of the South African
Constitution, according to the Court. The Constitution
"recognises the need for protection of the environment [and] the
need for social and economic development. It contemplates the
integration of environmental protection and socioeconomic
development." And, the Court says, the solution to this
conundrum is expressly identified in the Constitution, which
"envisages that environmental considerations will be balanced with
socioeconomic considerations through the ideal of sustainable
development."' 8 7
Drawing on the insights of international law-especially the
1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and DevelopmentI 88-the
Court asserts that the notion of sustainable development "offers an
important principle for the resolution of tensions between the
need to protect the environment on the one hand and the need
for socioeconomic development on the other hand." 8 9 The key to
assigning appropriate weight to the potentially contrarian
elements is that modern development in South Africa must "pay
attention to the costs of environmental destruction." 90 In support
of the notion that "the environment and development are thus
inexorably linked"' 91 the Court notes favorably some core insights
of the United Nations' Brundtland Report.
186. Id. para. 93.
187. Id. para. 45.
188. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio deJaneiro,
Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaralion on Environmenl and Development, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. 1), Annex I (Aug. 12, 1992).
189. Fuel Retailers, 2007 (10) BCLR 1059 para. 57.
190. Id. paras. 44-45.
191. Id. para. 44.
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[E]nvironmental stresses and patterns of economic development
are linked one to another. Thus agricultural policies may lie at
the root of land, water, and forest degradation. Energy policies
are associated with the global greenhouse effect, with
acidification, and with deforestation for fuelwood in many
developing nations. These stresses all threaten economic
development. Thus economics and ecology must be completely
integrated in decision making and lawmaking processes not just
to protect the environment, but also to protect and promote
development. Economy is not just about the production of
wealth, and ecology is not just about the protection of nature;
they are both equally relevant for improving the lot of
humankind.' 92
This aptly conveys the "integration of environmental protection
and socioeconomic development" required by the post-apartheid
constitutional order. 193
Ultimately then, Fuel Retailers is important for two reasons. It
affirms the constitutional significance of environmental legislation
- especially NEMA, but also ECA-which empowers the National
Assembly to address environmental concerns and raises the stakes
through a clear assertion of Court oversight. Even more
importantly though, is the Court's discussion of the interrelation
between economic development and environmental protection.
The Court essentially "constitutionalizes" sustainable
development. It also bolsters the centrality of "sustainable
development and use" by emphasizing the centrality of
sustainability to all economic development in South Africa. When
the Court says that "[p]romotion of development requires the
protection of the environment," they mean that to be so
functionally, not just legally. "Sustainable development and
sustainable use and exploitation of natural resources are at the
core of the protection of the environment." 9 4 Only sustainable
development is consistent with the new constitutional order
imagined in Section 24.
192. Id. (quoting World Commission on Environment and Development, Report of the
World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future (Brundtland Report),
ch. I para. 42, U.N. Doc A/42/427 (Aug. 4, 1987)).
193. Id. para. 45.
194. Id.
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b. HTF Developers.
In MEC Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment v.
HTF Developers (HTF Developers) the Court addresses the
applicability of certain internal notice and comment periods under
statutory environmental law. 195 The context of the case regarded
previously undeveloped "virgin ground," the development of
which would constitute a "substantial detrimental effect on the
environment" and was thereby prohibited under the ECA.19 6
Although the Court resolved HTF Developers on a fairly narrow issue
of statutory interpretation (and with a rather short judgment), the
case allowed the Court to reiterate and expand upon the
importance of certain elements of NEMA.197
The Court approvingly discusses NEMA's "risk-averse and
cautious approach, whereby, negative impacts on the environment
and on people's environmental rights [are] anticipated and
prevented, and where they cannot be prevented, are minimized
and remedied."198 The Court acknowledges that the protective
procedures mandated by NEMA create "tension with other rights
contained in the Bill of Rights, most notably property rights and
the right to freedom of trade and occupation" and asserts that,
unlike those rights, environmental rights are "collective rights"
rather than private rights.199 Nevertheless, their collective nature
does not mean they inherently "supersede or eclipse" other
rights. 2 0 0 Rather, proper consideration under NEMA (and the
Constitution) "must take into account the interests, needs and
values of all interested and affected parties."o20
Adopting language from an earlier trial court decision, the
HTF Developers Court supports the notion that the right to a clean
environment is a "composite right, which includes social,
economic and cultural considerations" to achieve sustainability. 212
This expansive assessment occurs properly when the relevant
195. MEC Deplt of Agric., Conservation and Env't v. 11TDevelopers (Ply) Ltd., 2007 (4)
BCLR 417 (CC) (S. Afr.) [hereinafter IITFDevelpers].
196. Id. para. 6.
197. Id. paras. 24-26.
198. Id. para. 24 (quoting NEMA, supra note 169, §2(4) (a) (vii-viii)).
199. Id. para. 26.
200. Id.
201. NEMA, supra note 169, § 2( 4 )(g).
202. BP Soutliern (Pty) Ltd. v. MECfor Agtic., Caonservatian and Land Aflairs, 2004 (5) SA
124 (W) at 144 H-145 A.
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government entities consider the provisions of NEMA's Section 2,
which identifies a collection of environmental management
principles to reconcile economic development and environmental
protection. 203 As summarized by Justice Ngcobo,
This requires authorities who are charged with the protection of
the environment to consider a diverse range of factors including
taking action to avoid, remedy and minimize the disturbance of
the eco-system and loss of biological diversity, the pollution and
degradation of the environment. 204
When the Court affirms or announces guidelines for
interpreting environmental statutes, like NEMA, ECA, and others,
in a manner that supports expansive and protectionist approaches,
this strengthens the importance of NEMA for all environmental
management decisions. It is appropriate for the Court to do so
because those statutes flow directly from the obligation created for
government actors under Section 24.
c. Bengwenyama Minerals.
In Bengwenyama Minerals v. Genorah Resources, the Constitutional
Court reviewed the procedures and standards for granting mining
and prospecting rights on another's land.20 5 In Bengwenyama
however, the parties differed slightly from the typical case. The
respondents at the Constitutional Court, were an established
mining company (Genorah Resources, which is a minority owned
business subject to treatment as a "historically disadvantaged
person")20 6 and the national government officials who had granted
mining permits to the company. But the applicants were a tribal
council, trustees and a mining company affiliated with the land's
owner-occupiers, the Bengwenyama-Ye-Maswazi Community in the
rural Limpopo Province (the Community), a "community that was
previously. deprived of formal title to their land by racially
discriminatory laws." 2 0 7
203. NEMA, supra note 169 § 2.
204. HTF Developers, 2007 (4) BCLR 417 at para. 63, (Ngcobo, J., dissenting)
(internal marks omitted).
205. Bengwenyama Minerals (Pty) Ltd. v. Genorah Res. (Pty) Ltd., 2010 (3) BCLR 229
(CC) (S.Afr.) [hereinafter Bengwenyama].
206. Bengwenyama, 2010 (3) BCLR 229 para. 2.
207. Id.
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i. Addressing a history of injustice.
Over the course of nearly three years prior to litigation,
Bengwenyama Minerals and Genorah Resources were pursuing
competing licenses to prospect on Community lands, with the
license eventually being granted to Genorah by the national
mining authority without proper notice or comment from the
Community. 208 The controversy arises because of both the
historical context and the irregular administrative process.
The Court had to evaluate the appropriateness of
administrative action against the backdrop of "the profoundly
unequal impact our legal history of control and access to the
richness and diversity of the country's mineral resources has had
on the allocation and distribution of wealth and economic
power." 209 This influences the Court's decision because the
Constitution promotes not only formal equality, that is,
nondiscrimination under the law, but also substantive equality,
such as genuine access for all to the "the full and equal enjoyment
of all rights and freedoms." 210 Thus the Constitution anticipates
"legislative and other measures ... to protect and advance persons
disadvantaged by unfair [past] discrimination."2 1' This is relevant
to Bengwenyana because of South Africa's apartheid era policies of
discriminatory access to land and to mineral wealth. Just as the
post-apartheid Constitution provides for land restitution, the
"Constitution also furnishes the foundation for measures to
redress inequalities in respect to access to the natural resources of
the country."212 As the Court unsurprisingly states, " [there is no
denying that past mining legislation and the general history of
racial discrimination in this country prevented black people from
acquiring access to mineral resources. Dispossession of land
aggravated the situation."213
The Court discusses the other rights that inform the
application of Section 24 norms as well. Section 25 of the
Constitution, which discusses real property rights and is one of the
208. [d. paras. 7-23.
209. Id. para. 1.
210. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 2, § 9(2).
211. Benguenyama, 2010 (3) BCLR 229, para. 3.
212. /d. para. 3. One of the parcels of land at issue in Bengwenyatma was taken from
the BEN Community in 1945 but restored under the new post-apartheid Constitutional
order. Id.
213. I. para. 28.
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longest section in the Bill of Rights, "recognizes the public
interest in reforms to bring about the equitable access to ...
natural resources, not only land, and requires the state to foster
conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an
equitable basis."214 The Court not only acknowledges the existence
of "communities with right or interests in law in terms of
agreement, custom or [1]aw," but it announces a "special category
of right" for those communities. 215 In addition to their typical
rights as owners of real property, they hold a "preferent right to
prospect on their land." 216 This right is held despite the otherwise
superseding role of the state as custodian of all natural
resources. 217
The "preferent right" arises from the interaction of Sections 24
and 25 of the Constitution and the Mineral and Petroleum
Resources Development Act (MPRDA). It existence further
strengthens the need to consult the community right-holder when
a third party seeks a license to exploit resources on their land,
since they are yielding substantial rights in addition to being
subject to the disturbance and potential harm of prospecting or
mining. The absence of notice to the Community of the Genorah
application is thereby a greater fault than it would have been if
they were merely effected residents - their property rights are at
risk, notjust their administrative justice rights. 218
The case includes a substantive discussion of the MPRDA. 219
The MPRDA was enacted in part to remedy past discrimination, in
access to mineral wealth and to actualize "constitutional norms"
related to environmental protection, equitable property rights,
and access to food and water. 220 The stated objectives of the
MPRDA include to
promote equitable access to the nation's mineral and petroleum
resources . . . [to] substantially and meaningfully expand
214. Id. para. 72.
215. Id. paras. 72-73.
216. Id. para. 73.
217. Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002, pmbl. (S. Afr.).
218. The Court chastises the Department later in the opinion for not making greater
efforts to "properly assist[] [the Community] in what was obviously an effort to acquire
prospecting rights on their own property." Bengioenyama, 2010 (3) BCLR 229, para. 79.
219. Bengvenyama, 2010 (3) BCLR 229, paras. 29-41; Mineral and Petroleum
Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 (S. Afr.).
220. Bengwenyama, 2010 (3) BCLR 229, para. 3.
262 [Vol. 32:215
SOUTH AFRICAN ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS
opportunities for historically disadvantaged persons, including
women, to enter the mineral and petroleum industries and to
benefit from [them], [to] advance the social and economic
welfare of all South Africans, and [to] give effect to section 24 of
the Constitution by ensuring that the nation's . . . resources are
developed in an orderly and ecologically sustainable manner
while promoting justifiable social and economic development.221
ii. Administrative and remedial fairness.
Additionally, principles of fair notice and an opportunity to be
heard are discussed in Bengwenyama as they are in many of the
South Mrican environmental decisions. The considerations are
drawn from the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (PAJA), 222
which is itself a legislative enactment of the due process principles
in Section 29 of the Constitution.22 3 The Bengwenyama Court
discusses the requirement that state decision-making must be
"taken in accordance with principles of lawfulness, reasonableness,
and procedural fairness." 224
Bengwenyama also allows the Constitutional Court to opine
significantly on the availability and appropriateness of remedies in
environmental (and property rights) cases arising out of
inadequate government action. While it hesitates to "lay down
inflexible rules [for] determining ajust and equitable remedy" for
unlawful administrative action, the Court acknowledges that "each
case must be examined in order to determine whether factual
certainty requires some amelioration of legality and, if so, to what
extent."225 If the party unknowingly benefited from unlawful
actions by a state entity and relied on them to its detriment, the
Court has substantial freedom to grant any "fair and just remedy"
under the Constitution and the PAJA might require remediation
of any overly harsh result.
Because law is often a "pragmatic blend of logic and
experience," the Court asserts it does no harm to "the
fundamental constitutional importance of the principle of legality,
which requires invalid administrative action to be declared
unlawful," for the Court to use its expansive discretion to limit the
221. Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 § 2 (S. Mr.).
222. Promotion of Administrative justice Act 3 of 2000 (S. Mr.).
223. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 2.
224. Bengvenyarna, 2010 (3) BCLR 229, para. 61; Promotion of Administrative Justice
Act 3 of 2000 § 6 (S.Afr.).
225. Bienpgenyama, 2010 (3) BCLR 229, para. 85.
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detrimental effect on the recipient of improper administrative
determinations. The consequence of the Court's approach in
Bengwenyama is that the Community and their allied parties secure
their rights and a reward for the time and effort of litigation but
the cost to non-governmental respondents is mitigated to the
extent they relied on plausible state administrative processes.
The consequence of the case as a whole is found in two
elements. First, is the announcement of the "preferent right" for
owner-occupiers. This necessarily incorporates environmental
concerns into the larger South African program of land (and
natural resource) restitution. It strongly supports close
consideration of the rights and interests of native owner-occupiers.
Secondly, Bengwenyama demonstrates that additional pieces of
statutory law, here the MPRDA and PAJA will be used by the Court
to advance the eco-protective principles of the Constitution.
d. Maccsand v. City of Cape Town.
In Maccsand Ltd. v. Cape Town (Maccsand),226 the Court again
discussed environmental rights in the context of mining.
Apartheid era officials had been extremely accommodating to
mining interests and the post-apartheid Constitution made mining
and natural resources an area of exclusive national competence-
even though environmental protection was an area of national and
provincial shared competence. 227 The Maccsand Court noted that
"Mining plays an important role in the national economy"2 28 and
the interplay of mining and environmental issues "clearly raises
constitutional issues."229
The Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act was a
very new statute when the Maccsand dispute first arose in 2007.230
The MPRDA is intended, according to the Court, to be
"transformative" legislation, seeking to "eradicate all forms of
discriminatory practices in the mineral and petroleum industries"
and declaring mineral and petroleum resources to be "the
heritage of all the people" with "the state [as] custodian."23'
226. Maccsand (Pty) Ltd. v. City of Cape Town 2012 (4) SA 181 (CC) (S. Afr.)
[hereinafter Maccsand].
227. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, sched. 4, pt. A.
228. Maccsand, 2012 (4) SA 181, para. 39.
229. Id. para. 37.
230. Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 (S. Afr.).
231. Maccsand, 2012 (4) SA 181, para. 3.
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Acting though the national Minister for Mineral Resources, who
has expansive powers to assign mining rights, South Africa uses the
MPRDA to control and regulate access to natural resources
throughout the country.
The Minister had authorized mining operations in several
areas including several undeveloped areas of Cape Town.
However, Maccsand could not mine the Cape Town locations
because the nationally approved areas were not zoned for mining
or prospecting under municipal law. Cape Town relied on the
provincial Land Use Planning Ordinance (LUPO)2 3 2 to prohibit
Maccsand's mining operations on city-owned public open space
within the municipality. The city opposed the mining because the
area was near schools and homes. Maccsand claimed that the local
land use law could not limit their rights to mine because "in the
event of a conflict between [national and provincial] laws, the
MPRDA prevailed because it regulated a functional area vested in
the national sphere of government."2 3 3 Cape Town insisted that
their zoning laws created an independent and valid restriction on
the use of regulated municipal land.
The Court sided with Cape Town and their authority under
LUPO. Although the provinces have no authority in assigning
mining licenses, "mining may only be undertaken on land if the
zoning scheme permits it (or a departure is granted). If not,
rezoning of the land must be obtained before the commencement
of mining operations." 234 There is no "conflict between LUPO and
the MPRDA. Each is concerned with different subject matter."
MPRDA evaluates mining authorization against national standards
and LUPO assesses the appropriate uses for municipal lands.
The fact that in this case mining cannot take place until the land
in question is appropriately rezoned is therefore permissible in
our constitutional order. It is proper for one sphere of
government to take a decision whose implementation may not'
take place until consent is granted by another sphere. . 3
232. Land Use Planning Ordinance 15 of 1985 (Western Cape) (S. Afr.).
233. Maccsand, 2012 (4) SA 181, para. 27.
234. Id.
235. Id. para. 48 (citing Miister of/Public Winks v. Kyalami Ridge Envt' Ass's 2001 (7)
BCLR 652 (CC) para. 59 (S. Aft.)).
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The creation of multi-level authorization requirements is
important for at least two reasons related to environmental
protection. First, it challenges the notions that mining is
extraordinary and the mining industry is too economically vital to
be subject to regulation. This is important because of the
environmental damage caused by mining processes. Furthermore,
the exceptional status of mining companies-evident in the
overwhelming deference to the industry during apartheid and
mining's special constitutional status as an exclusively national
concern 236-seems to be at an end.
Secondly, it empowers local governments to evaluate
environmental harms in the context of appropriate land use
determinations. The municipality and people who reside in the
area are likely to have a far greater investment in the accurate
assessment and successful mitigation of environmental harms. Of
course, local entities may also have a greater interest in secondary
economic benefits from industrial employment, but the significant
change is the affirmation of local governmental authority over
potentially damaging land uses. Municipalities will not have the
only say in such decisions; the mining companies can appeal to the
provincial government when stymied by towns. And the Court
reminds all the government entities of their constitutional duty "to
cooperate with one another in mutual trust and good faith, and to
co-ordinate actions taken with one another."237
IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN ADJUDICATION
OF ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS
All the elements discussed previously in this Article-the rise
of constitutional environmentalism, the history and text of the
environmental protections, and the case law-contribute to the
importance of the South African Constitution's protections and
the Court's jurisprudence. As a result of its unique history and
236. Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002, pmbl. (S. Afr.).
237. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 3, § 41 (cited in Maccsand, 2012 (4) SA 181 para. 47).
Of note, the Court failed to address an additional question, declaring the issue was not yet
ripe. The national Minister of Water Affairs and Environment also claimed authority to
weigh in on mining authorizations. Maccsand and others argued that NEMA did not apply
to decisions made under MPRDA because the Mining Act worked outside the NEMA
framework. Id. paras. 27-28. A future case is likely to present this issue before the Court
more directly.
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constitutional structure, the South African Constitutional Court
possesses special capacities to address domestic environmental
concerns and impact comparative law discourse regarding
constitutional environmental rights. The judiciary has already
demonstrated successful, albeit modest, domestic adjudication
through its early environmental jurisprudence and it exhibits the
potential for even more significant outcomes in the future. The
Court holds a highly influential position in the field of
comparative constitutional law because of its expansive rights
protections, permissive jurisdictional rules, hard-wired
consideration of foreign and international law, and its unrivaled
reputation among academics and jurists. Altogether, this highly
influential court is intellectually and politically capable of
supporting a dramatic evolution in the field of constitutional
environmental rights.
A. Environmental Adjudication in South Africa
1. Characteristics of the current juisprudence.
The Court's environmental jurisprudence occurs against the
background discussed earlier in this paper: enumerated rights to
an environment that is not harmful to health and is protected to
ensure sustainability; purposive rights interpretation in service of
the core constitutional values of dignity, equality, and democracy;
and provisions allowing liberal access to the courts and broad
discretion in judicial remedies.
Although there have been a limited number of environmental
rights cases before the Constitutional Court, the Court's
announcement of broad but impactful enforcement principles
allows us to highlight several elements that characterize the
Court's early environmental jurisprudence. Many of the lessons of
the cases are easily applicable beyond their narrow facts and
specific history. Moreover, the congruent structure and
interrelated nature of environmental legislation in South Africa (at
least at the dominant national level) has the consequence of
making the constitutional rulings in any one case relevant to
multiple pieces of environmental legislation.
For purposes of this Article, the jurisprudential elements are





Several elements of the Court's case law evidence the theme of
empowerment in its environmental jurisprudence-empowerment
of people and local governments. The Bengwenyama case
demonstrates the Court's dedication to empowering local residents
when environmental decision-making may harm their
communities. Partially, this is accomplished through fair
procedural standards, also discussed below, because empowerment
of residents involves open information and meaningful
consultation and is supported by the threat of invalidation of the
authorizations granted where local concerns are inadequately
addressed.
Additionally, the Maccsand judgment pointedly empowers local
government. By affirming the on-going role of municipalities in
land use assessment, even where national mining interests are
concerned and national permissions have been granted, the Court
gives power to local officials to choose if some environmentally
harmful land uses are appropriate for their community. Or, where
they wish, officials can presumably bargain for (or at least expect)
cleaner or otherwise more beneficial characteristics to mining,
power generation and other industrial projects over which they
effectively have a veto.
The final empowerment element is evident in the willingness
of the Court to address the mining industry. Mining is one of the
most potentially destructive and polluting commercial activities in
South Africa, but mining is also one of the most economically
important industries in South Africa. The "enormous damage
mining can do to the environment and ecological systems" has
been recognized repeatedly in the case law and by environmental
organizations. 238 Hence, the Court has demonstrated the breadth
of Section 24 application in a particularly strong way by limiting
the environmentally damaging acts of mining companies in several
of its early cases.
b. Fair and cautious processes.
The issue of procedural fairness comes up in most
environmental cases. Among the cases discussed here,
Bengwenyama and Maccsand are particularly concerned about the
238. Director: Mineral Dev., Gauteng Region v. Save the Vaal Envt 1999 (2) SA 709 (SCA)
para. 20 (S. Afr).
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processes that lead to environmental decisions. Has the necessary
information been made available; have the effected parties been
consulted with a reasonable opportunity to critique and effect the
result; and have the appropriate governmental agencies been
consulted relative to their differing expertise and concerns? The
effectiveness and fairness of decision-making procedures, a
concern in many areas of rights adjudication, is central to the
Court's jurisprudence in the area of environmental protections. As
the Court has said in a related case: "The democratic government
that is contemplated is partly representative and partly
participatory, is accountable, responsive and transparent and
makes provision for public participation in the law-making
process." 239
Moreover, the Court affirms the use of cautious standards in
decision-making that may harm the environment. In both Fuel
Retailers and HTF Developers, the Justices cite NEMA's "risk-averse
and cautious approach, whereby, negative impacts on the
environment and on people's environmental rights [are]
anticipated and prevented, and where they cannot be prevented,
are minimized and remedied." 240 The Court has particularly
favored caution when the harms are unknown or uncertain.
Rather than requiring evidence of assured harm, the Court
supports an approach that is generally more protective than
permissive.
c. Integration.
It goes without saying that the Court's interpretation of Section
24 rights is broadly construed to serve the goal of a healthy,
sustainable environment in the context of a country seeking to
advance dignity, equality, and freedom. Those elements of the
Court's jurisprudence are fixed by the Constitution's textual
requirements for interpretation. 2 4 1 But there are several
interpretive elements that are unique to the environmental
jurisprudence.
The Court has shown the interrelation of Section 24 with the
property rights provision and the constitutional scheme for land
239. Doctors for LifeIn1iv. Speake of the Nat'1 Assembly, 2006 (6) SA416 (CC), para. 116
(S. Mr.).
240. Bengwenyama, 2010 (3) BCLR 229, para. 24; Fuel lietailers, 2007 (10) BCLR 1059,
181 (quoting Section 2(4) (a) (vii-viii) of NEMA).
241. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 2, § 39.
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restitution. In the Bengwenyama discussion of the "preferent right"
of owner-occupiers previously denied their land rights, the Court
integrates fair procedural requirements, constitutional property
rights of "equal access to natural resources," and environmental
protections through privileged disclosure, consultation and
influence for the resident Bengwenyama Community.
Additionally, the Court's affirmation of the National
Environmental Management Act reflects the efficacy of
integration. The Court speaks highly of NEMA in nearly all
environmental law cases. The principles that begin NEMA are
frequently cited as elucidating the pithy expression of
environmental values of the constitutional text.2 42 The core, quasi-
constitutional task of the statute is seen in the full title of NEMA,
which identifies its role as framework legislation meant to
provide for co-operative environmental governance by
establishing principles for decision-making on matters affecting
the environment, institutions that will promote cooperative
governance and procedures for co-coordinating environmental
functions exercised by organs of state; to provide for certain
aspects of the administration and enforcement of other
environmental management laws; and to provide for matters
connected therewith. 243
Creation and judicial support for framework legislation of this
kind streamlines the introduction and maintenance of
constitutional values in modern and apartheid era statutes and
more effectively disseminates the Court's rulings throughout
legislative and executive actions.
Additionally, integration is the overarching premise of the
Court's approach to economic development and environmental
protection. In both HTF Developers and Fuel Retailers the Court
stresses the centrality of the concept of sustainable development to
understanding the functional relationship between a wealthy and
healthy future South Africa. The Constitution "envisages that
environmental considerations will be balanced with socio-
economic considerations through the ideal of sustainable
development."2 4 4 Sustainability as a concept is itself integrative,
242. Fuel Retailers, 2007 (10) BCLR 1059, para. 40.
243. NEMA, supra note 169.
244. HTFDevelopers, 2007 (4) BCLR 417, para. 44-45.
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supporting consideration of both present and future generations
and present and future environmental conditions. Sustainable
development is also a famously slippery concept, but the Court's
insistence on evaluating sustainable development and sustainable
use of natural resources at least ensures that the considerations of
sustainability will not merely be presumed to be satisfied for any of
the legislation passed under statutes with internal sustainability
requirements.
The Court presentation of environmental right jurisprudence
as involving a "composite right," one that includes consideration
of social, economic, and cultural elements also demonstrates the
commitment to integration. The Court expresses a need to
evaluate and consider the cumulative impacts of individual
environmental harms but also the socioeconomic impact of
environmental decisions in HTFDevelopers.
In general, the Court's environmental jurisprudence is typified
by robust enforcement of expansively interpreted environmental
rights to a healthy environment and sustainable development and
use of natural resources. The Court particularly requires
integrated decision-making processes; they must proceed
cautiously, consider all relevant social, economic, and cultural
factors, and meaningfully involve effected persons and
communities.
2. Assessing the Court's environmental rights juisprudence.
At his retirement, the first President of the South African
Constitutional Court affirmed the Court's central duty:
What the Constitution demands of [the Court's justices] is that a
legal order be established that gives substance to its founding
values-democracy, dignity, equality and freedom; a legal order
consistent with the constitutional goal of improving the quality of
life of all citizens, and freeing the potential of each person. The
challenge facing us as a nation is to create such a society; the
challenge facing the judiciary is to build a legal framework
consistent with this goal.245
Any assessment of the current environmental jurisprudence of
the Court must begin with a reminder of the goal: a viable and
245. Justice Arthur Chaskalson, Farewell Speech given at the Constitutional Court of
South Africa (Jan.. 3, 2011).
2712013]
272 STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LA WJOURNAL
beneficial legal framework for environmental protection in
accordance with constitutional values.
But the capacity of courts to effect significant change is limited.
Those limits are likely to be even more significant when courts are
adjudicating rights other than traditional civil and political rights,
when there is less comparative or international support for their
adjudication, or when the adjudication of the rights potentially
raises significant separation of powers issues or threatens economic
development. And, each of those descriptions applies to South
African enforcement of constitutional environmental rights in the
last two decades. Hence, observers are rightly skeptical of the
judiciary's capacity to, in this case, "save the planet."
Additionally, any assessment of the Court's jurisprudence must
also recognize the particular challenges in the context of
environmental protection-transnational harms and the need for
transnational solutions, the significant potential for rulings to
interfere with political decisions, and the need for highly-
specialized knowledge, among other concerns. The only
reasonable expectations are genuinely modest ones-at least when
measured against the enormity of the problems of environmental
degradation, especially in poor areas and resource-heavy
developing countries. It is in light of such humble expectations
(and perhaps only in that context) that the Court's work can be
seen as substantially beneficial in the four ways discussed below.
a. Reaffirming constitutional values.
The Constitutional Court is the "the key institution of [South
African] constitutional democracy," the primary guardian and
expositor of the Constitution.2 46 From the time it was founded and
given the task of certifying the Constitution and guaranteeing
inclusion of the previously negotiated characteristics of the final
Constitution to its on-going charge to monitor the lower judiciary
and the assess the validity of government actions, the Court has
been at the center of South Africa's transition. It is the most visible
symbol of the modern constitutional state.
To the extent that the Court's review of current controversies
encourages popular or legislative dialogue about constitutional
246. CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, About the Court,
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/thecourt/history.htm (last visited May 30,
2013). As the Court's website states: "[T]he 11 judges stand guard over the Constitution
and protect everyone's.human rights." Id.
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commitments to the environment, it further advances the values of
the Constitution. It reminds all South Africans that the
Constitution's historic promises remain relevant to present
problems. This strengthens and reinforces the role of the
Constitution in contemporary society. Indeed, it is perhaps a
particularly vital role of these early . generations of the
Constitutional Court to reinforce the values of the founding
generation through their written judgments. With its review of
environmental disputes, the Court advances the express
commitments to a healthy environment and to environmental
protections in Section 24 but also supports the rights to fair
administrative action, land restitution and the core values of
dignity, equality, and democratic self-governance.
The Court's insistence on fair, participatory procedures and
open administrative hearings and decision-making promotes the
constitutional values of democratic involvement and public
governmental action. Similarly, the Court's has affirmed the
complementarity of environmental rights and land reform rather
than casting them in opposition. The announcement of a
preferent right in Bengwenyama demonstrates one means of
coordinating these two constitutional principles.
Moreover, with environmental rights, which some people likely
view as inhibiting economic progress or contributing to
unemployment (when, for example, development projects are
halted for environmental reasons), the Court plays a critical role,
reminding South Africans of the commitments they made in the
Constitution-even if those commitments appear inconvenient or
undesirable in particular circumstances. This is facilitated by the
Court's enviable position of perceived neutrality, which allows the
Court to assert environmentalism as a constitutional value in a
more credible way than advocates could. The discussion of
sustainable development and use in Fuel Retailers is an example
where the Court takes on this role of impartial evaluator and
educator. It explains and affirms the Constitution's values rather
than adopting the values of one side or other in the dispute.
b. Providing a basis for ights claims.
Even among the many countries with environmental rights, few
countries have substantial, consistent, and protective case law
under their environmental rights provisions. Either because the
country has a weak rule of law, the provisions are textually
2732013]
STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL IA WJOURNAL
identified as unenforceable, or due to judicial under-enforcement,
many nations do not adjudicate environmental rights as they do
other rights. Moreover, even among countries with enforceable
constitutional environmental rights, few have the permissive access
provisions that the South African Court does. Hence the most
direct way in which the Constitutional Court advances
environmental protection in South Africa is by hearing claims,
enforcing rights and remedying harms under Section 24. The
Constitutional Court has asserted the enforceability of Section 24
along with all other rights. It has affirmed the actual justiciability
of environmental rights in practice. And, the Court has announced
tangible remedies that have altered the behavior of private
industry and government agencies. The Court has reaffirmed the
parity of all the rights included in the Bill of Rights, including
Section 24. "In the current constitutional dispensation the right to
a clean environment must enjoy recognition equal to that which is
accorded other rights."247
Moderate success has been evident in the Court's judgments in
the specific substantive areas brought before it. The Court has
affirmed local government land use authority as independent from
national licensing authority. It has prohibited siting a gas station
where insufficient consideration was given to sustainability issues.
It has halted development of "virgin ground" where the
constitutional principles that animate environmental statutes were
insufficiently considered. And, it has denied mining permits where
the local community was given insufficient input. These are not
insignificant results for a modest number of cases over a less-than-
two-decade history.
Moreover, the Section 24 protections yield both interpretive
guidance and substantive constitutional rights. The case law is
most often a reflection of constitutional values as justifications for
broad, purposive interpretation of statutory environmental law,
but Section 24 also gives rise to substantive, constitutional
requirements. In the presence of a statute, interpretation
consistent with Section 24 will be the guide, but in the absence of
any appropriately protective law, the substantive provisions of the
constitution permit independent claims.
But even these direct influences are not necessarily the most
consequential, despite the Court's expansive powers. The Court's
247. IITF Developers (Pty) Ltd. v. Minister of Envtl. Affairs & Tourism 2007 (5) SA 438
(SCA) at para. 25 (S. Afr.).
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case law has a much more substantial. effect indirectly through
other South African courts. The High Courts and other lower
courts in South Africa consider a far greater number of
environmental cases. The Court has not only provided direct
precedent for some issues, but it has provided general guidance
for many more. The Court has modeled a means of interpreting
statutory law that is informed by constitutional environmental
values in addition to modeling direct constitutional enforcement.
In fact, by constitutionalizing the major environmental statutes-
especially the NEMA framework legislation-the Court has
authorized the lower courts to interpret elements of that Act and
similar statutes in expansive ways that serve environmental
purposes. ,
c. Influencing policymakers and decision-makers.
The third notable benefit of the *Court's environmental
adjudication is its intentional and proactive use of its judgments
and judicial orders to steer state actors to act consistently with their
constitutional obligations. Courts to some extent always use this
guidance function; the nature of legal precedent is intended to
inform private and state actors of the import of particular legal
results for relatively similar parties in relatively similar, future
situations. But the South African Constitutional Court has gone
further.
The Court's willingness to robustly enforce the Constitution's
provisions guides governmental outcomes through indirect
influence and the direct threat of invalidation. This can occur in
more abstract ways, such as in the perceived rejection of carte
blanche authority for the mining industry (as a result of Maccsand),
or in specific ways through identification of required elements for
environmental review, such as the meaningful inclusion of affected
local communities in Bengwenyama. Because of respect for the
Court-and its capacity to step into future disputes-the Court's
opinions inform legislative decision-making and facilitate
appropriate executive action. Presumably, future legislative
drafting or amending of legislation relevant to environmental
protection will be informed by the existing jurisprudence-as will
executive policies and procedures.
Indeed, occasionally this guidance becomes censure. The
South African courts have also evidenced frustration with under-
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enforcement of environmental provisions. 8 Other governmental
actors would be naive to think the Court will not step in and act
when the facts in a future case demonstrate "the slow and
inexorable grinding of wheels across a bureaucra'tic landscape
regardless of the urgency of the situation."2 49 The threat of this
kind of opprobrium should motivate (at least minimally) adequate
government responses to future environmental concerns.
The impact the threat of judicial review has had in promoting
environmental legislation at a national and provincial level is an
ultimately unknowable (and unpredictable) element of the
"success" determination. But it seems reasonable to assume that
the combination of enumerated environmental rights and active
enforceability by the Court will aid alignment of environmental
needs and governmental action over time.
Certainly, the Court's environmental rulings are warnings to
private industry, where litigation and expense pressures may be
even more persuasive. The Court's expressed standards for
popular consultation and environmental impact assessment steer
rational decision-making by private economic actors in ways that
facilitate environmental values. A natural resources company is
more likely to choose extraction methods that are less damaging to
the environment if there is a real threat that the otherwise less
expensive means will be challenged in court and are likely to then
to reject. Even the cost-benefit analysis of bribing local officials is
different if there is a real chance of secondary review of the
decision by the courts.
d. Supporting civil society.
One of the most foreseeable elements of the Court's
jurisprudence is the requirement for local consultation-but it is
also potentially the one with the most significant consequence.
Requiring disclosure and consultation, or as the Court states it in
another context, "meaningful engagement," 250 arises from both
248. Wildlife Soc'y of S. Afr. v. Minister of Envil. Affairs &' Tourism 1996 (1) BCLR 1221
(T) at 42 (S. Mr.) ("It is difficult to understand why, in the face of overwhelming evidence
of illegal land practice uses, it was considered necessary to determine 'political support'
for action to be taken . . . and why there should have been such a remarkable and
disturbing reluctance immediately to [enforce the law].").
249. Id. at 43. This case from the Transkei Provincial Division was decided under the
interim Constitution before the coming into force of the 1996 Constitution and the re-
organization of the courts.
250. See, e.g., Occupiers of 51 Olivia Rd., Berea Twp. v. City of Johannesburg 2008 (5)
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the Constitution and statutory law.25 1 The Court strengthens these
requirements and increases their influence through actual,
qualitative evaluation of engagement. The Court not only asserts
an expectation that public disclosure and consultation will actually
occur but also issues orders with real consequences when it does
not.
Civil society groups are also strengthened through the Court's
jurisprudence and rules. Local community groups are empowered
in their dealings with corporations (and even the national
government) because the groups' opinions about the quality of
local consultation and the failings of any approved plans may
inform future litigation. The threat of litigation is real because of
South African courts' expansive standing provisions and the
perpetual fallback position of a constitutional claim before the
Constitutional Court. The Court demonstrated an even greater
consequence of local consultation rules in the context of post-
apartheid land reform in Bengwenyama, where the Court
invalidated a previously issued government license for mining
because the local owner-occupiers had a preferent right to select
the recipient of licenses for resource extraction.
At the present stage, eighteen years after the Court began
hearing cases under the post-apartheid Constitution, there is
evidence of modest success on the part of the Court at openly
reaffirming the nation's commitment to a healthy environment
and sustainable development and actively identifying specific
deficiencies in governmental management and regulation of the
environment and corporate environmental practices. Moreover,
the Court has indirectly pressured the government to advance the
protective goals of the constitutional text and conspicuously
supported the work of formal and informal civil society groups.
The results may be limited at this stage but they are significant in
relative terms and there are reasons to believe they will grow most
significant in time.
B. The South African Constitution as a Global Model for Human Rights
If end-of-the-century human rights scholars had written a "best
practices" manual for
BCLR 475 (CC) paras. 18-23 (S. Afr.).
251. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, ch. 2, § 33 ("Eveyone has the right to administrative
action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair."); Promotion of Administrative
Justice Act 3 of 2000 (S. Afr.).
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constitution drafters, the chapter on "What to Include in Your
New Bill of Rights" would look very much like the South Africa Bill
of Rights in the 1996 Constitution. Of course, this is no
coincidence. The process of drafting the South African
Constitution was "a deliberate attempt to have a fundamental
instrument of government that embraced basic human rights."252
The final text not only included numerous, enforceable rights but
one of its primary identified purposes was to "establish a society
based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human
rights." 253
Moreover, the first generation of justices to interpret the
Constitution, they themselves steeped in the international human
rights tradition, 254 saw rights adjudication as a core purpose of
their institution. As former Chief Justice Chaskalson described it,
"[u]nder our Constitution the normative value system and the
goal of transformation, are intertwined." 255  This ideology is
focused on an image of South Africa as a reformed nation-not
just a liberal democracy but a "human rights state"-which is in
the process of rising to its great potential to transform itself and to
be an example to other nations. 25 6 The "Constitution demands [of
judges] . . . a legal order be established that gives substance to its
founding values -democracy, dignity, equality and freedom."2 57
One result of this constitutional history is a great deal of
respect for the South African Constitution, which has been
described as one of the "newer, sexier and more powerful
operating systems in the constitutional marketplace." 25 8 American
Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg agreed, recently
252. Jonathan Faull, Praising the South African Constitution, AFRICA IS A COUNTRY (Feb.
16, 2012), http://africasacountry.com/2012/02/16/praising-the-south-african-
constitution/ (quoting U.S. Supreme CourtJustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg).
253. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, pmbl.
254. Many of the justices, especially the ANC members, had joined foreign law
faculties, human rights organizations, and NGOs, or had participated in meetings or
international conferences related to apartheid and human rights. See website of the
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, judges, http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za
(last visitedJan. 6, 2012) (providing biographies of current and formerjustices).
255. Chaskalson, supra note 245.
256. S. Afr. Const. 1996, pmbl.
257. Chaskalson, supra note 245.
258. Adam Liptak, 'We the People' Loses Appeal with People Around the World, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 6, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/07/us/we-the-people-loses-
appeal-with-people-around-the-world.html; Jonathan Faull, supra note 252. Even South
Africa agrees. S. AFR. CONST. 1996.
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encouraging Egypt to look to the model of the South African Bill
of Rights as an exemplar for its new constitution.259 This makes the
Constitution even more important in comparative context; it is
recommended as an example for burgeoning democracies.
Although the lived reality could not possibly match the promise of
its founding document, "South Africa's pro-human rights
constitution, stable government, democratic institutions,
independent judiciary, and strong economy mean it has great
potential to become a global human rights leader."260
The content of the constitutional provisions matters as well.
South Africa chose to include both the healthy environment
element and an environmental protection element. This decision
by the drafters to include expansive constitutional environmental
rights in the South African Constitution has impact far beyond the
country's borders. The South African Constitution is a well-
respected extant model for other countries and future
constitutions.
The Constitutional Court's jurisprudence is also a model for
other nations. With an eye on the international community, the
Court's work helps to build a "united and democratic South Africa
able to take its rightful place as a sovereign state in the family of
nations." 261 In pursuit of this project, the Court has boldly
advanced traditional political rights, as well as social welfare rights
and now environmental rights. The Court's opinions are
frequently discussed by comparative legal scholars, appear in many
comparative law textbooks and its judges are frequent visitors and
speakers at law schools worldwide. There is abundant exposure to
South African constitutional law because of the respect for the
Constitutional Court judges, the admiration for its Bill of Rights,
and the nation's compelling history as a human rights state born
out of apartheid.
This bolsters the significance of the Court's environmental
rights jurisprudence. The South African Constitutional Court,
drawing on a greatly respected Constitution and considering
international and comparative law in its decisions, finds
environmental rights to be justiciable and enforceable. Because
the judgments come from the South African Court, they are more
259. Liptak, supmi note 258.
260. HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 201/: South Africa Annual Cunty IAport,
http://www.hrw.org/world-report-20 11/south-africa.
261. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, pmbl.
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likely to be noticed and they may more easily join the comparative
law conversation about human rights adjudication. The South
African Court has always seen itself as part of a global conversation
about constitutional values and constitutionalism; but when the
Court speaks about environmental rights in its cases, it is not only
speaks to an international audience but it addresses a topic of
global concern.
V. CONCLUSION
"Bold constitutions require bold judges."2 62 So said the then-
member of the ANC Constitutional Committee (and later
Constitutional Court Justice) Albie Sachs in a book about human
rights during the negotiations that ended apartheid. And the
insight remains true as modern constitutional drafters include
bold new rights to a healthful and sustainable environment in their
governing documents. But traditional models of adjudication may
be inadequate; novel rights require new processes and approaches.
The South African model of adjudication is one such innovative
approach.
The South African Constitutional Court has already
demonstrated successful, albeit modest, domestic adjudication
through its early environmental case law. Moreover, its social
welfare rights jurisprudence and capacious purposive approach to
rights adjudication reveal potential avenues for even more
significant outcomes in the future. The Court has interpreted
South Africa's Section 24 environmental rights provisions not only
in light of its protection of a healthy and sustainable environment
but in light of other enumerated rights and the purposive charge
of the Constitution generally: to advance liberty, dignity and
equality.
So, is South Africa an environmental lawyer's paradise? No.
The long standing exploitation of land, the economic reliance on
resources that are finite or destructive to the land when extracted
(such as diamonds and gold), and the historical use of land
regulation in the larger scheme of apartheid have contributed to
unsustainable exploitation of natural resources and pollution. The
relative novelty of environmental rights, their relative
unimportance in the scheme of immediate human needs, a lack of
information about constitutional and legislative remedies, and a
262. SACHS, supra note 63, at 214.
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lack of resources to educate or assert such rights contribute to the
present inadequacies of environmental protection in South Africa.
However, the current circumstances are also encouraging. The
Constitution includes expansive protections for the environment
and the Court has prohibited ecological harms and affirmed
requirements for government protection in its early case law.
Ultimately, constitutions are expressions of a nation's ideals,
reflections of enduring values and commitments. For many
modern nations like South Africa, environmental values are a part
of that.
Environmental problems are greater than a single nation and
thus the comparative value of their potential solutions are
particularly vital. In comparative perspective, the South African
Constitution and the Constitutional Court are noteworthy and
progressive. South Africa is uniquely positioned to advance and
influence the use of constitutional rights to protect the
environment. The Court holds a uniquely influential position in
the field of comparative constitutional law with its expansive rights
protections, permissive jurisdictional rules, hard-wired
consideration of foreign and international law, and its unrivaled
reputation among academics and jurists. The South African model
is thus important because its values of empowerment, fair process,
and integration have elicited a substantive, protective
environmental rights jurisprudence.
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